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Charging on the Margin
Paul T. Crane ∗
(forthcoming 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. (2016))
Abstract
The American criminal justice system has experienced a significant
expansion in the number and severity of penalties triggered by misdemeanor
convictions. In particular, legislatures have increasingly attached severe collateral
consequences to misdemeanor offenses—penalties such as being required to register
as a sex offender, prohibitions on owning or possessing a firearm, and deportation.
While there is a wealth of scholarship studying the effect this development has had
on defendants and their attorneys, little attention has been paid to the impact
collateral consequences have on prosecutorial incentives. This Article starts to
remedy that gap by exploring the influence collateral consequences exert on initial
charging decisions in low-level prosecutions.
Critically, the ability to impose certain collateral consequences through a
misdemeanor conviction unlocks an array of additional charging options for
prosecutors. As a result, prosecutors are now more likely to engage in a practice I
term “strategic undercharging.” A prosecutor engages in strategic undercharging
when she charges a lesser offense than she otherwise could, but does so for reasons
that advance her own aims—and not as an act of prosecutorial grace or leniency. In
other words, prosecutors can sometimes gain more by charging less. By explaining
why (and when) prosecutors are likely to engage in strategic undercharging, this
Article complicates the conventional wisdom that prosecutors reflexively file the
most severe charges available.
This Article also proposes that collateral consequences be factored into the
determination of what procedural safeguards are afforded a criminal defendant.
Under existing law, collateral consequences are generally deemed irrelevant to that
inquiry; the degree of procedural protection provided in a given case turns exclusively
on the threatened term of incarceration. Changing this approach could have several
salutary effects on the administration of collateral consequences. At a minimum, it
would honor a basic principle underlying our criminal justice system: the threat of
serious penalties warrants serious procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
Misdemeanor or felony? That is a question prosecutors routinely ask
themselves when deciding what charges to file in a given case. And the
answer is important, for misdemeanor prosecutions and felony
prosecutions differ in significant ways. Among other things, felonies
threaten more severe penalties than misdemeanors, but they also trigger
more procedural safeguards.
Accordingly, when a prosecutor is deciding whether to bring a felony
or misdemeanor charge, she generally must determine whether the ability
to impose heightened penalties is worth the costs generated by the more
demanding procedures. Sometimes the answer is obvious—homicide will
be charged as a felony, jaywalking as a misdemeanor. But often it is not.
For many cases, the alleged conduct could plausibly be charged as a felony
or as a misdemeanor. In those circumstances, prosecutors must decide
whether the ability to impose felony penalties is worth enduring felony
procedures.
That, at least, is the choice prosecutors traditionally faced when
charging on the margin. Over the last two decades, however, the American
criminal justice system has experienced a significant expansion in the
number and severity of penalties triggered by misdemeanor convictions. 1
Specifically, legislatures have increasingly attached severe collateral
consequences to misdemeanor offenses—consequences that formerly were
triggered only by felonies. 2 For example, misdemeanor convictions can now
lead to a defendant being required to register as a sex offender, prohibited
from owning or possessing a firearm, or deported. 3
This Article’s primary claim is that attaching those sorts of collateral
consequences to misdemeanor offenses provides prosecutors with strong
incentives to charge a borderline case as a misdemeanor rather than a
felony. This claim rests principally on two widely-accepted facts.
First, in many criminal cases, the most significant penalty at stake is
a collateral consequence rather than incarceration. 4 This is especially true
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
Collateral consequences are sanctions that fall outside the sentencing authority of the
trial court.
Some prominent examples include disenfranchisement, sex offender
registration, and firearm prohibitions. They are distinct from a conviction’s so-called direct
consequences, which include incarceration, fines, and terms of probation. For more on the
difference between collateral and direct consequences, see infra notes __ and
accompanying text.
3
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
4
Many criminal defendants are sentenced to little or no jail time upon conviction. See,
e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, What Are Defense Lawyers Good For?: Links Between Collateral
Consequences and the Criminal Process, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 151, 153-54 (2012) (observing
that 80% of all convictions are for misdemeanors and that only 20% of those cases result in
any term of incarceration; also observing that 60% of all felony convictions result in little
or no incarceration). But nearly every conviction carries with it one or more collateral
1

2

3

for cases involving relatively low-level prosecutions, which I consider here
to be prosecutions for either a low-grade felony or a misdemeanor. In those
cases, a collateral consequence will often be a prosecutor’s most potent and
enduring sanction.
Collateral consequences can frequently be used to further a
prosecutor’s sentencing aims, including the standard goal of reducing
threats to public safety. 5
Such consequences take on even more
significance in low-level prosecutions given their relative duration. While
incarceration terms for low-level convictions typically top out at a couple of
months—and rarely more than a few years—several key collateral
consequences last for decades or even life. For example, the obligation to
register as a sex offender lasts for a minimum of 15 years and sometimes for
life. 6 Firearm prohibitions are typically lifetime bans. And deportation
results in a permanent exclusion from the United States. In short, as the
drafters of the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act correctly
observed, “collateral consequences in many instances are what is really at
stake, the real point of achieving a conviction.” 7
The second key point involves the relationship between collateral
consequences and adjudicatory procedures. Collateral consequences are
generally deemed irrelevant for purposes of determining what procedural
safeguards must be afforded a criminal defendant. 8 Felony defendants
possess a bundle of heightened procedural entitlements—such as rights to a
grand jury, a preliminary hearing, increased discovery, and a jury trial—that
misdemeanor defendants are often denied. 9 Critically, the fact that a

consequence. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and
Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010) (“All individuals
convicted of criminal offenses, regardless of their sentences, are forced to confront the
various collateral consequences—the additional legal penalties—that result from their
convictions.”).
5
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
6
Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1088 (2012).
7
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, Prefatory Note at 4 (2010); Chin,
Defense Lawyers, supra note __, at 161-62 (“Congress and state legislatures have made
imposing collateral consequences on individuals one of the central functions of the
criminal justice system.”); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) (“[T]he
imposition of collateral consequences has become an increasingly central purpose of the
modern criminal process.”).
8
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes __ and accompanying text. To be clear, not all misdemeanor defendants
are deprived of all such safeguards. Some misdemeanor defendants, for example, enjoy a
constitutional right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S.
538, 541 (1989) (defendants charged with an offense that threatens more than six months
imprisonment have a right to a jury trial).
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misdemeanor conviction will result in a severe collateral consequence does
not trigger any heightened procedural protections.
Given these two facts—that collateral consequences are often the
most important component of a criminal prosecution and that they do not
trigger heightened procedural protections—it should become clear how the
attachment of severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses
affects prosecutorial incentives. Prosecutors are more likely to file
misdemeanor charges, because they can still achieve their most desired
penalty without having to endure the greater costs generated by felony
prosecutions. 10
At first blush, the choice to file a misdemeanor charge involving a
severe collateral consequence may appear to be a win-win for both sides:
prosecutors can pursue that case in a more efficient manner, while the
defendant is exposed to less potential incarceration. But, as is normally the
case with first glances, it turns out the full picture is more complicated—
especially for criminal defendants. This is because the decision of what
charge to initially file can have a domino effect on nearly every other aspect
of the case: the procedures afforded the defendant, the identity of the
prosecutor handling the case, the identity of the defense attorney charged
with holding the government to its burden (or negotiating a favorable plea),
and the identity of the judge managing the case to its conclusion. 11 On each
of those fronts, the defendant may be left at a greater disadvantage than if
he had been charged with a felony.
As already noted, felony defendants enjoy a bundle of procedural
safeguards that misdemeanor defendants typically do not. 12
These
safeguards are not only designed to ensure fair and accurate adjudications
but also provide defendants with meaningful bargaining chips during
negotiations. Misdemeanor prosecutors, moreover, are usually the most
junior members of the office and tend to be harsher than their felony
colleagues. 13 They are accordingly less likely to bargain away potential
penalties on equitable grounds alone. As for misdemeanor defense
attorneys, they tend to be the least experienced while carrying the most
voluminous caseloads. 14
Accordingly, a meaningful vetting of the
government’s case is usually the exception, not the rule.
Finally,

The incentives to file misdemeanor charges can be further strengthened by the fact that
misdemeanors are often easier to prove than felony offenses. Among other things,
misdemeanor offenses tend to have fewer elements and relaxed mens rea requirements.
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
10
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misdemeanor courts suffer the most acute docket pressures, meaning those
judges are likely to prioritize speed and docket clearance above all else. 15
This Article proposes that collateral consequences be considered
when determining what procedural safeguards must be afforded
defendants. Under existing law, that determination rests almost entirely on
the maximum term of incarceration authorized by the offense with which
the defendant is charged. But this longstanding approach fails to reflect an
important new reality: that severe penalties in the form of collateral
consequences are no longer reserved for felony convictions but are now
triggered by misdemeanor convictions as well. As detailed below, adoption
of this proposal could have several salutary effects on the administration of
collateral consequences. At a minimum, it would honor a basic principle
underlying our criminal justice system: the threat of serious penalties
warrants serious procedures.
By examining how the attachment of certain collateral consequences
to misdemeanor offenses influences prosecutorial charging decisions in
low-level prosecutions, this Article makes two contributions to the
scholarly literature.
The first is to enrich our understanding of the various charging
options available in a prosecutor’s toolbox. Much ink has been spilled—and
rightly so—about the strategy known as overcharging. 16 This Article
identifies an additional charging tactic that has thus far eluded scholarly
attention—a practice I term “strategic undercharging.” A prosecutor
engages in strategic undercharging when she charges a lesser offense than
she otherwise could, but does so for reasons that advance her own aims—
and not as an act of grace or leniency. The conventional wisdom, which is
rooted in the lessons of overcharging, is that prosecutors file the most
severe charges available. 17 This Article complicates that narrative by
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
At the risk of oversimplification, a prosecutor engages in overcharging when she charges
a case more severely than she ultimately thinks is warranted—either by filing more charges
or a single charge at a higher level than she ultimately thinks is merited. The prosecutor
can then use the threat of “unduly harsh potential punishments” as “leverage in bargaining,
offering substantial so-called concessions that merely lead to convictions and sentences
only on the warranted charges.” Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1117, 1155-56 (2008).
For a very small sampling of the extensive literature examining overcharging, see
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-105
(1968) (explaining the difference between horizontal overcharging and vertical
overcharging); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
17
See, e.g., Meares, supra note __, at 868-69 (claiming that “overcharging is systemic” and
that prosecutors “often believe that it is in their best interests to charge the defendant with
the most serious and as many crimes at the outset of the case”); ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 31 (2009) (“Prosecutors routinely engage
15

16
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explaining why, at least in certain contexts, prosecutors will not reflexively
file the most serious charge possible. Prosecutors will sometimes exercise
their charging prerogative by filing a lesser charge and, in so doing, gain the
strategic advantage that comes from significantly reducing a defendant’s
procedural entitlements.
The second is to shine a light on the relationship between collateral
consequences and procedural safeguards. There has been no shortage of
scholarship examining collateral consequences and the right to counsel,
including the advice defendants are constitutionally entitled to receive
about potential consequences of conviction. 18 But whether potential
collateral consequences should impact a defendant’s procedural
entitlements has escaped sustained scholarly scrutiny. This Article begins
to remedy that gap by interrogating the continued wisdom of relying solely
on potential imprisonment as the metric for determining the procedural
safeguards afforded a defendant.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background
information about collateral consequences, their expansion into the
universe of misdemeanor offenses, and their relative importance to
prosecutors in low-level cases. Part II examines the incentives that lead
in overcharging, a practice that involves ‘tacking on’ additional charges that they know
they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or that they can technically prove but are
inconsistent with legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate.”).
18
See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV.
CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1, 28 (2013); Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic
Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants
Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 591 (2011); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is
Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea
Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119 (2009); Chin & Holmes, supra note __. See also, e.g., Jenny
Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOWARD L.J. 693 (2011); Chin, Defense Lawyers,
supra note __; Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675 (2011); McGregor Smyth, Holistic is Not a Bad
Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy
Strategy, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 479, 494-95 (2005). The scholarly focus on defense counsel
and advice, especially recently, is unsurprising given that was the issue in Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
By contrast, examination of the influence collateral consequences have on
prosecutors and their charging decisions has been minimal. See, e.g., Heidi Altman,
Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for Noncitizen
Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2012) (explaining that the “role of the prosecutor . . . has been
largely unaddressed in the literature and advocacy materials that have emerged since” the
Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky); MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL.,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 8:3
(2014) (leading treatise on collateral consequences stating that “there has been little
attention paid to whether prosecutors should take collateral consequences into account
when making charging decisions”). Altman’s article appears to be the main exception to
this trend. Her article, however, focuses exclusively on the role deportation plays during
plea bargaining—not its impact on initial charging decisions. See Altman, supra, at 4-8.

7

prosecutors to engage in strategic undercharging when a severe collateral
consequence is triggered by a misdemeanor offense. Part III explores some
of the ripple effects caused by a decision to file a misdemeanor instead of a
felony. Part IV explains why collateral consequences should be considered
when determining what procedural safeguards are afforded a defendant.
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

This Part describes the key role collateral consequences often play in
low-level criminal prosecutions. Section A summarizes the distinction
between collateral and direct consequences. Section B explains that
misdemeanor offenses increasingly trigger significant collateral
consequences, thereby eroding the sharp felony-misdemeanor divide that
previously existed for collateral consequences. Section C identifies the
collateral consequences that have the most salience from the perspective of
prosecutors. Finally, Section D describes why prosecutors often view the
imposition of one or more collateral consequences as the core objective of
many low-level prosecutions.
A.

Collateral Consequences vs. Direct Consequences

The legal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction are
often divided into two groups: direct and collateral. 19 Although there is
some dispute over how to precisely define each category, 20 the best rule of
thumb—and the one suggested by the Supreme Court in its landmark
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky—is that direct consequences are limited to
those matters “within the sentencing authority of the state [or federal] trial
court.” 21 A collateral consequence, by contrast, is any sanction or disability
See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences:
Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 678 (2008).
Of course, criminal convictions can also have significant non-legal consequences, including
adverse effects on private employment prospects and generating various forms of social
stigma. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Wayne A. Logan, Informal
Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (2013); Pinard, Integrated Perspective, supra
note __, at 624 n.1 (collecting sources). See also John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1049-55 (2009) (“Researchers have discovered that any
amount of incarceration creates a significantly higher likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer
a variety of health-related, economic, and social harms with substantial negative hedonic
consequences . . . .”). Although the term collateral consequences has on occasion been
used to refer to non-legal consequences, my use of the phrase is limited to a conviction’s
legally-imposed consequences. See LOVE ET AL., supra note __, at § 1:8.
20
See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 n.8 (2010); Roberts, Mythical Divide, supra
note __, at 689-93 (detailing how courts have used at least three different verbal
formulations when articulating the line between direct and collateral consequences).
21
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364; Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 (2013).
Commentators have similarly emphasized the role and authority of the sentencing court
when attempting to delineate the realm of collateral consequences. See, e.g., LOVE ET AL.,
19
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imposed by law as a result of a criminal conviction that is in addition to the
conviction’s direct consequences. 22 In other words, collateral consequences
“are not part of the explicit punishment handed down by the court; they
stem from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the
court.” 23
There is general consensus that incarceration, fines, criminal
forfeiture, and terms of probation or supervised release are all direct
consequences of conviction. 24 Consequences generally understood to be
collateral include sex offender registration, civil commitment, civil
forfeiture, firearm prohibitions, disenfranchisement, preclusion from juror
service, bans on running for public office, disqualification from public
benefits (such as public housing or food assistance), ineligibility for
business and professional licenses, termination or limitation of parental
rights, and—for non-citizen defendants—deportation. 25
The distinction between direct and collateral consequences first
gained legal prominence following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v.
United States. 26 Brady established that, in order to comply with the Due
Process Clause’s voluntariness requirement, a trial court need only ensure
supra note __, at § 1:8 (“[W]e endorse ‘collateral consequences’ as a generally serviceable (if
not entirely precise) term to describe the range of legal penalties and disabilities that flow
from a criminal conviction over and above the sentence imposed by the court.”). A focus
on the sentencing authority of the trial court makes particular sense given the origins of
the collateral consequence rule. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
22
See, e.g., Court Security Act of 2007, PUB. L. NO. 110-177, § 510(d), 121 STAT. 2534, 2544
(2008); Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, § 2(1)-(2) (2010).
23
Pinard, Integrated Perspective, supra note __, at 634.
24
See, e.g., Roberts, Ignorance, supra note __, at 124.
25
See, e.g., Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108 n.5; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 376-77 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment); Chin & Holmes, supra note __, at 704-05.
Some collateral consequences are mandatory in nature, while others afford the
pertinent decision-maker some degree of discretion when determining whether to apply
them. The former, which are also known as “collateral sanctions,” typically apply
immediately and automatically upon conviction. Common examples include sex offender
registration, disenfranchisement, and firearm prohibitions.
“Discretionary
disqualifications,” on the other hand, involve penalties or disabilities “that an
administrative agency, official, or a court is authorized, but not required, to impose on an
individual convicted” of an offense. Court Security Act of 2007, PUB. L. NO. 110-177, § 510(d),
121 STAT. 2534, 2544 (2008); ABA Standards of Criminal Justice, Collateral Sanctions and
Discretionary Disqualifications of Convicted Persons, Standard 19-1.1 (2003).
26
397 U.S. 742 (1970); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 706, 726-30 (2002)
(discussing Brady). Brady was not, however, the first time the Supreme Court had
considered the potential relevance of collateral consequences. In a line of cases beginning
in the 1940s, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s appeal of his conviction
was not rendered moot by the completion of his sentence of incarceration, so long as he
remained subject to potential collateral consequences from the challenged conviction. See,
e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968) (summarizing earlier decisions); Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
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that a defendant is aware of the “direct consequences” of conviction before
entering a guilty plea. 27 In other words, a trial court had no obligation to
inform a defendant of a conviction’s potential collateral consequences
before it accepted the plea as valid.
Although Brady involved only a trial court’s constitutional duties
during plea colloquies, it reflected a view that later took root in several
other criminal law domains: a conviction’s collateral consequences do not
warrant the same degree of procedural attention as a conviction’s direct
consequences. 28
B.

The Erosion of the Felony-Misdemeanor Line

The classification of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors has long
been a foundational aspect of the American criminal justice system. 29
Among other things, the penalties facing the defendant typically turned on
that classification. In most jurisdictions, felonies are defined as offenses
that authorize more than one year imprisonment, whereas misdemeanors
are offenses that authorize no more than one year imprisonment. 30
Although the line formally dividing felonies and misdemeanors is a
prison-centric one, a substantial part of what previously distinguished
felonies from misdemeanors was also the number and severity of collateral
consequences that flowed from a conviction. 31 Until relatively recently, the
overwhelming majority of collateral consequences had been triggered only
by a felony conviction. 32 As Chief Justice Warren observed in 1960,
“[c]onviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only
makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability
statutes, but which also seriously affects his reputation and economic
opportunities.” 33
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note __, at 703-23 (detailing how Brady’s collateral
consequences rule infiltrated the Sixth Amendment’s effective assistance of counsel
doctrine).
29
See 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) (3d ed. 2014).
30
See id.
31
Indeed, this historic divide dates back to the English common law, where “[n]o crime was
considered a felony which did not occasion a total forfeiture of the offender's lands or
goods or both.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32
See, e.g., Walter Matthews Grant et al., The Collateral Consequences of Conviction
(Special Project), 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 955-60 (1970). To be sure, some misdemeanor
offenses resulted in collateral consequences as well. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (noting that a “range of civil
disabilities may result from misdemeanor convictions,” such as “forfeiture of public office,”
“disqualification for a licensed profession,” and “loss of pension rights”). But those were
dwarfed by the number of consequences triggered by felony offenses.
33
Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added);
see also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasizing
the significance of an offense being “transformed from a misdemeanor into a felony”
27

28
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Since the 1990s, however, more and more collateral consequences
are triggered by misdemeanor convictions. 34 As a result, the sharpness of
the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors—at least in terms of
post-conviction consequences—has been dulled. 35
C.

Collateral Consequences and Prosecutors

While scholars have primarily focused on how collateral
consequences impact defendants and defense attorneys, 36 these
consequences can also play an important role in how prosecutors charge
(and later negotiate) a case. Indeed, the National Prosecution Standards
promulgated by the National District Attorney’s Association, 37 the United
States Attorney’s Manual, 38 and the American Bar Association’s Criminal
because of “all the serious collateral consequences that a felony conviction entails”);
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 n.6 (1974) (“Moreover, even putting to one side the
potentiality of increased incarceration, conviction of a ‘felony’ often entails more serious
collateral consequences than those incurred through a misdemeanor conviction.”).
34
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1799 & n.49 (2012); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1323-27 (2012).
The recent upsurge in collateral consequences triggered by misdemeanor
convictions is merely one part of an overall mushrooming of collateral consequences over
the last three decades. For a taste of the extensive literature detailing how and why
legislatures increasingly adopted collateral consequences beginning in the late 1980s, see,
e.g., TRAVIS, supra note __, at 66-68; Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on
Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1218 (2010); Kevin
G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis III, Reanalyzing the prevalence and social context of
collateral consequence statutes, 31 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 435, 451 (2003); Demleitner, supra note
__, at 154-55.
35
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 292 (2011) (“[H]owever a particular crime is
labeled, the collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions render less significant the
line between felonies—at least low-level ones—and misdemeanors.”).
36
For the effect collateral consequences have on defendants, see, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT
THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISON REENTRY (2005); INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Michael Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry
Issues Faced By Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006); Gabriel J.
Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 255 (2002); Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y R. 153, 154-55 (1999).
And for the effect collateral consequences have on defense attorneys, see supra note __.
37
See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standards 4-1.3 (3d ed. 2009); see also Chin &
Holmes, supra note __, at 720 & n.202.
38
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL §§ 9-27.230, 9-27.240, 927.250. Interestingly, the Manual’s most extensive discussion of collateral consequences is
found in the section titled “Principles Of Federal Prosecution Of Business Organizations.”
See id. § 9-28.1000.
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Justice Standards 39 all recommend that prosecutors consider potential
collateral consequences when making initial charging decisions. 40
To be sure, prosecutors will not always know every potential
collateral consequence facing a defendant when deciding what charges, if
any, to file in a given case. 41 But they will know many of them, including
several of the most severe. This is especially true for those collateral
consequences that are triggered automatically by a conviction for a
particular offense, and therefore do not vary according to the individual
characteristics of the defendant. 42 For example, a prosecutor will (or at
least should) know “which sex offenses lead to registration [such] that this
can be taken into account in the charging decision.” 43
For purposes of deciding what charges to file, prosecutors care about
some consequences more than others. For example, prosecutors will be
most interested in imposing collateral consequences that further the varied
purposes of criminal prosecution, such as deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, or incapacitation (or some combination thereof). 44 In
particular, prosecutors are often animated by a desire to reduce threats to
public safety. 45 Collateral consequences that advance that goal are therefore
likely to be penalties of particular interest to prosecutors. 46
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.9 (b) (3rd. ed. 1993).
40
See LOVE ET AL., supra note __, at § 8:3; Chin & Holmes, supra note __, at 720-21. See also
Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, 16 CRIM. JUSTICE 32 (Fall 2001) (thenPresident of the National District Attorneys Association advising all prosecutors to
“comprehend the full range of consequences that flow from a crucial conviction”).
41
See LOVE ET AL., supra note __, at § 8:3.
42
Id. (“There are some cases where a prosecutor will or should know about potential
collateral consequences even before filing formal charges.”); Robert M.A. Johnson, A
Prosecutor’s Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 133
(2011).
43
LOVE ET AL., supra note __, at § 8:3.
44
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL §§ 9-27.300
(identifying the “purposes of criminal law as punishment, protection of the public, specific
and general deterrence, and rehabilitation”).
45
See, e.g., Johnson, Prosecutor’s Expanded Responsibilities, supra note __, at 131 (former
President of the National District Attorneys Association explaining that the “primary
objectives” of sentencing “are protecting the public from future crime by the offender and
punishing the offender”).
46
Prosecutors are typically less concerned with other types of collateral consequences,
such as voter disenfranchisement or disqualification from juror service. As one former
prosecutor I interviewed explained, “I never thought about voting [rights]” when making
charging decisions. Telephone Interview with Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5,
2015); see also Telephone Interview with Individual B, Former Prosecutor (June 3, 2015)
(same). (For more details about my interviews with current and former prosecutors, see
infra note __.) The point, of course, is not that such consequences are trivial (they are not),
but rather that from the prosecutor’s perspective, they rarely move the charging needle one
way or the other.
39
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Beginning in the 1990s, legislatures greatly expanded the number
and availability of collateral consequences that seek to curtail future risks to
public safety. 47 Three prominent examples are sex offender registration,
firearm prohibitions, and deportation. 48 Each is aimed, at least in part, at
reducing threats to public safety. 49 And, critically, each is now triggered
not only by certain felony convictions but also by a variety of misdemeanor
offenses. 50
1. Sex Offender Registration
In 1986, eight states had laws requiring certain sex offenders to
register with law enforcement. 51 Twelve years later, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia “had enacted legislation requiring that convicted sex
offenders register with the police upon release from prison.” 52 The
obligation to register as a sex offender typically applies automatically upon
conviction of a registerable offense, as defined by the pertinent
jurisdiction. 53 Today, the vast majority of jurisdictions include some
One quantitative study published in 2003, for example, found a “sharp rise in the use [by
legislatures] of firearm restrictions, sex offender registration statutes, and the termination
of parental rights.” Kevin G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis III, Reanalyzing the prevalence
and social context of collateral consequence statutes, 31 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 435, 451 (2003); see
also Demleitner, supra note __, at 154-55.
48
These are not the only collateral consequences aimed at minimizing future threats to
public safety. Additional examples include the termination or limitation of a defendant’s
parental rights and involuntary civil commitment as a “sexually violent predator.” For a
discussion of the latter, see, e.g., Roberts, Mythical Divide, supra note __, at 703-09 (noting
that the first statute authorizing the civil commitment of persons deemed “sexually violent
predators” was passed in 1990 and that now the Federal Government, 20 states, and the
District of Columbia permit involuntary commitment on such grounds).
49
For an interesting analysis of whether sex offender registration laws actually promote
public safety, see Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L.
& ECON. 207 (2011) (questioning the effectiveness of sex offender registries). For a
discussion of whether the federal firearms ban for misdemeanor domestic violence has
successfully incapacitated domestic abusers, see Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in
Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1459-60 (2005). And for a thoughtful
examination of the public safety rationale commonly offered as a justification for
conviction-based deportation, see Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and
Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889
(2000).
50
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2013) (explaining that “some misdemeanors carry grave, nearly
automatic collateral consequences such as deportation [and] sex-offender confinement or
registration”).
51
TRAVIS, supra note __, at 67; Buckler & Travis, supra note __, at 443.
52
TRAVIS, supra note __, at 68; Buckler & Travis, supra note __, at 443.
53
For a helpful summary of the numerous and onerous obligations currently imposed on
sex offenders, as well as expanded community notification schemes, see Catherine L.
Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender
Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (2012).
47
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misdemeanors in their lists of registerable offenses. 54 Registration periods
range from 15 years to life, depending on the jurisdiction and qualifying
offense. 55
2. Firearm Prohibitions
Congress began forbidding the possession of firearms by certain
criminal offenders in 1938, 56 and eventually prohibited all felons from
possessing a firearm in 1968. 57 It did not limit the ability of misdemeanants
to possess firearms, however, until 1996. 58 Congress made it unlawful for
any person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence” to purchase or possess a firearm that has travelled in
interstate commerce. 59 In addition to the federal ban, 16 states currently
prohibit the possession of firearms by persons convicted of misdemeanor
domestic violence offenses. 60 Firearm prohibitions typically apply
automatically and immediately upon conviction of a qualifying offense.

See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 298-99 (2011); John D. King, Beyond “Life and
Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1, 28 (2013);
see also, e.g., N.Y. Correction Law Code §168-a (listing five misdemeanors as registerable
offenses).
55
See, e.g., Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note __, at 1088 (“Today, a tier I offender [the least
serious offender] generally must register for a minimum of fifteen years or, often, twenty
years. Additionally, many more crimes today have been assigned lifetime registration or
recast to require lifetime registration.”).
56
Federal Firearms Act, PUB. L. NO. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938); see Conrad Kahn,
Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by Nonviolent Felons, 55 S. TEX. L.
REV. 113, 116 (2013).
57
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, PUB. L. NO. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197; Gun
Control Act of 1968, PUB. L. NO. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. See also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t
Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 698 (2009).
58
See Mikos, supra note __, at 1457 & n.153.
59
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, PUB. L. NO. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-371 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)
(defining a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to include state and federal
misdemeanor offenses).
60
See, e.g., Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Domestic Violence & Firearms Policy
Summary (May 11, 2014), available at http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-firearmspolicy-summary/ (last visited July 3, 2015).
The existence of federal and state firearms bans raises another notable feature of
collateral consequences: they can be imposed by more than one sovereign. While a
conviction’s direct consequences invariably are levied by the same jurisdiction that
prosecuted the offense, a conviction’s collateral consequences are not so limited. For
example, a state court conviction may yield state and federal collateral consequences. This
dynamic permits prosecutors to leverage collateral consequences that are imposed by
separate sovereigns.
54
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3. Deportation 61
The laws governing deportation were largely overhauled in the
1990s. 62 Among other things, Congress “increased the number of crimes
triggering deportation.” 63 Most relevant here, Congress significantly
expanded the number of misdemeanor offenses that render a noncitizen
deportable. 64 For example, Congress made a conviction for any offense
“relating to a controlled substance”—subject to one narrow exception
involving minor marijuana possession—automatic grounds for
deportation. 65 Congress likewise made a wide swath of offenses involving
domestic violence and child abuse grounds for deportation. 66 In short, a
large number of “misdemeanors—a category of crimes where those
convicted often serve no jail time—can lead to removal.” 67 And they often
do. 68
The Court in Padilla observed that deportation is “uniquely difficult to classify as either a
direct or a collateral consequence.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. In my view, however,
deportation is still best understood to be a collateral consequence for at least two reasons.
First, the great weight of authority preceding Padilla consistently classified deportation as a
collateral consequence, see, e.g., Roberts, Ignorance, supra note __, at 132, and Padilla
expressly avoided upsetting that nearly uniform precedent. Second, the Supreme Court’s
reticence to classify deportation as a collateral consequence appeared to dissipate in its
subsequent decision in Chaidez v. United States, where it described deportation as a
collateral consequence on multiple occasions. See, e.g., 133 S. Ct. at 1108. In any event, my
central claim does not hinge on whether deportation is in fact classified as a collateral or
direct consequence, since it is not accounted for when determining which set of
adjudicatory procedures are required in a given case.
62
See The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978, 5050. Congress first made certain criminal convictions a basis for deportation in 1917.
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361 (citing The Immigration Act of 1917).
63
Mikos, supra note __, at 1444 n.93; see also Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1683, 1722-1725 (2007).
64
See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758-63 (2013); Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L.
REV. 553, 560-61 (2013); Clapman, supra note __, at 591. Congress also “eliminated most
statutory forms of relief” and abolished a sentencing court’s ability to prevent deportation
through a procedure known as a “judicial recommendation against deportation.” See
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361-64; Mikos, supra note __, at 1444 n.93; see also Stumpf, supra note
__, at 1722-1725.
65
See 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368; Cade, supra note __, at 1760.
66
See 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
67
Lee, supra note __, at 561.
68
See, e.g., Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes,
Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (Apr. 7, 2014); Altman, supra note __, at 14. The Obama
Administration’s recent actions regarding immigration enforcement continues to prioritize
the removal of persons convicted of crimes, including several classes of defendants
convicted only of misdemeanor offenses. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson,
Secretary of Homeland Security to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director U.S.
61
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D.

Collateral Consequences and Low-Level Prosecutions

To the extent the current scholarly literature discusses the impact
collateral consequences have on prosecutors, it tends to focus on the
exceptional case. Commentators often highlight instances where the
prosecutor believes the imposition of a particular consequence is
unwarranted, and how the prosecutor is then forced to engage in various
charging machinations in order to avoid triggering that consequence. 69
But that is not the typical case. 70 More commonly, the prosecutor
thinks the consequence is not only justified but also important. Indeed, for
cases involving only low-grade felonies or misdemeanors, securing one of
the aforementioned collateral consequences will likely be a key—if not the
key—prosecutorial objective. This is true for several reasons.
First, the collateral consequence almost always lasts longer than the
defendant’s term of incarceration, which for low-level offenders is usually
short or non-existent. 71 For example, the obligation to register as a sex
offender lasts for a minimum of 15 years and oftentimes for life. The federal
prohibition on firearm possession is a lifetime ban. Similarly, deportation
amounts to a permanent exclusion. As a result, a prosecutor’s most potent
and enduring weapon against future public safety risks may be a collateral
consequence of conviction. 72
Second, collateral consequences often expose the defendant to a
lengthy incarceration term if he violates the pertinent prohibition, thereby
Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and
Removal
of
Undocumented
Immigrants
(Nov.
20,
2014),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretio
n.pdf.
69
The literature is replete with such anecdotes and hypotheticals. See, e.g., Smyth, supra
note __, at 494-95; Catherine A. Christian, Awareness of Collateral Consequences: The Role
of the Prosecutor, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 621, 622 (2005); see also LOVE ET AL.,
supra note __, at §§ 8:3, 8:7. It is especially pronounced in discussions involving
deportation. See, e.g., Lee, supra note __, at 579.
70
See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in
Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1187 (2013) (finding that “immigration
consequences are [often] an express prosecutorial goal of the conviction” in Maricopa
County, Arizona); Altman, supra note __, at 29-32 (reporting that less than 5% of line
prosecutors in King’s County, New York (Brooklyn) surveyed responded that they “often”
or “always” alter a plea offer because of the potential immigration consequences faced by
the defendant; also reporting that approximately 45% responded “rarely” or “never”).
71
Most felony convictions result in little or no actual jail time. See, e.g., Chin, Defense
Lawyers, supra note __, at 153; Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117,
1145 n.139 (2008). And very few misdemeanor defendants spend any time in jail. See Chin,
supra, at 153-54 & n.22 (observing that, between 2006 and 2010, less than 20% of persons
arrested in New York on misdemeanor charges were ultimately sentenced to prison or jail).
72
See, e.g., Roberts, Mythical Divide, supra note __, at 674 (“collateral consequences often
far outweigh the direct penal sanction of a conviction”); Demleitner, supra note __, at 154
(“[F]or many convicted offenders . . . these ‘collateral’ consequences ‘are . . . the most
persistent punishments that are inflicted for [their] crime.’”).
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bolstering the consequence’s specific deterrent effect. For example, if a
defendant fails to register properly as a sex offender, he can be charged with
a criminal offense punishable by more than a decade in prison. 73 Similarly,
an offender found in unlawful custody of a firearm may be sentenced up to
10 years in prison. 74 And a person who has been deported but then
unlawfully reenters the country can be prosecuted and imprisoned for that
reentry. 75 For each of these offenses, establishing a violation is usually
straightforward—and typically much easier to prove than the underlying
offense that triggered the collateral consequence. 76
Third, many collateral consequences—including two highlighted
here—represent a guaranteed penalty upon conviction. In other words,
these collateral consequences cannot be circumvented by a sentencing
judge, which is significant for prosecutors concerned about controlling the
penalties imposed on a defendant. 77 For example, if convicted of a
qualifying offense, a defendant will be required to register as a sex offender.
Firearm prohibitions work this way, too. While deportation is not formally
guaranteed, a defendant rendered eligible for deportation likely will be
removed if he is later detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 78
In sum, prosecutors will often be attuned to collateral consequences
that further the goals of criminal prosecution, especially those aimed at
reducing threats to public safety. When it comes to low-level offenses,

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2250.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a).
75
See 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
76
Notice how much lighter the government’s burden will be in these subsequent cases: Did
the defendant fail to properly register? (Not did the defendant commit a sex offense.) Was
the defendant found in possession of a firearm? (Not did the defendant commit an act of
domestic violence.) Was the defendant found in the country after being removed? (Not
did the defendant commit the deportable offense.)
In addition, the subsequent violations are easier to prove because they typically
turn on law enforcement witnesses, not lay witnesses. Compared to police witnesses, “lay
witnesses are less reliable, easier to impeach, and less certain to cooperate with pretrial
investigation and trial preparation or even to appear and testify in the event of trial.” Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Discretion Not to Prosecute, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1713 (2010).
77
See, e.g., Johnson, Collateral Consequences, supra note __ (“These collateral
consequences are simply a new form of mandated sentences. Prosecutors have often
favored mandated sentences to counter the tendencies of some judges who seem incapable
of giving serious consequences for serious crimes.”). In this respect, mandatory collateral
consequences work in many ways like mandatory minimum prison sentences, including by
enhancing the prosecutor’s relative power since she controls the penalty through her
charging discretion. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note __, at 161; William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2562 (2004).
78
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-64 (observing that deportation “is practically inevitable” in
most cases after a defendant who was convicted of a removable offense has been detained).
73

74
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those collateral consequences are often the most important goal of a
criminal prosecution. 79
II.

STRATEGIC UNDERCHARGING: WHY LESS IS SOMETIMES MORE

As detailed in Part I, several collateral consequences of considerable
interest to prosecutors are now triggered by misdemeanor convictions.
This has meaningfully expanded a prosecutor’s charging options. For cases
where imposition of the collateral consequence is a crucial prosecutorial
aim, an inability to obtain that consequence through a misdemeanor
conviction effectively forces the prosecutor to bring a felony case. The
recent attachment of severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor
offenses therefore unlocks an array of additional charging options for
prosecutors keen on imposing such a consequence.
But do prosecutors actually exercise that newfound charging option?
In this Part, I explain there are several reasons why a prosecutor might
choose to file a misdemeanor charge instead of a felony charge—that is,
why she might engage in strategic undercharging—when a critical collateral
consequence is triggered by a misdemeanor conviction. To be clear, I do
not claim that prosecutors will choose the misdemeanor option in every
case. Rather, my claim is that we should expect prosecutors to file a
misdemeanor charge in a significant number of cases, and far more often
than the conventional wisdom suggests. 80
The key point is that an offense’s collateral consequences, no matter
how severe, are generally deemed irrelevant for determining what
procedural safeguards apply. In other words, a misdemeanor that threatens
a severe collateral consequence is classified the same as any other
misdemeanor in a jurisdiction’s criminal justice system.
Because misdemeanors are less costly and time-consuming to
prosecute than felonies, filing a misdemeanor furthers prosecutorial desires
for efficiency. See Section B. In some cases, the likelihood of conviction is
also increased by filing a misdemeanor—and it is generally no less than if a
felony were charged. See Section C. Finally, while prosecutors pursuing a
misdemeanor case must surrender the prospect of additional incarceration,
the degree of that sacrifice is typically much smaller than one might
expect—and often not enough to offset the substantial benefits associated
with increased efficiency and a higher likelihood of conviction. See Section
D.
See, e.g., Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, Prefatory Note at 4 (2010);
Pinard, Integrated Perspective, supra note __, at 684 (recognizing “the centrality of
collateral consequences to the criminal process”).
80
See, e.g., Meares, supra note __, at 868-69 (stating that “overcharging is systemic” and
that prosecutors “often believe that it is in their best interests to charge the defendant with
the most serious and as many crimes at the outset of the case”).
79
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A.

The Choice

Before examining how prosecutors exercise their charging discretion,
it is important to understand who is responsible for the initial charging
decision and the lasting impact that decision typically has on a case.
One common practice, especially in larger offices, is to designate a
group of prosecutors as having primary responsibility for screening
incoming cases and making charging decisions. 81 These prosecutors tend to
be relatively senior and most of their time is dedicated to handling the
influx of new cases. 82 After the charging decision is made by the screening
attorney, the case is then assigned to the pertinent line prosecutor.
Another common practice is for line prosecutors to screen cases on a
rotating basis and, if charges are filed, continue to prosecute many of those
same cases. 83 For those prosecutors, the process of screening cases is one
way new matters are added to their caseload. But those prosecutors do not
necessarily keep every case they screen, even if charges are filed. Line
attorneys who moonlight as screeners often handle only felony matters.
Therefore, if the new matter involves only misdemeanor charges, the case
may be assigned to a prosecutor in that office’s misdemeanor division.
Of course, the neat division outlined here oversimplifies matters to
some degree. Some offices have both groups, while others follow a different
model altogether. The main point is that the incentives of the prosecutor
making the initial charging decision may vary depending on whether she is
a dedicated screener or a line attorney doubling as a screener.
Prosecutors enjoy tremendous discretion when deciding what
criminal charges, if any, to pursue in a given case. 84 As one leading scholar
The screening attorneys studied by Ronald Wright and Marc Miller in their examination
of the New Orleans District Attorney’s Office generally fit this mold. See Ronald Wright &
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002). As Wright and
Miller detail, the New Orleans District Attorney’s Office had a dedicated “Screening
Section,” in which “about fifteen of the eighty-five attorneys in the office” worked at any
given time. See id. at 62-63. In New Orleans, the screening attorney exercises significant
authority and discretion on behalf of the office: “The screener reviews the investigation file,
speaks to all the key witnesses and the victims (often by telephone, but sometimes in
person), and generally gauges the strength of the case.” Id. at 63. “For the most serious
crimes,” Wright and Miller report, “the office conducts ‘charge conferences’ with senior
prosecutors and police present to discuss the facts and potential charges.” Id. at 64. But
aside from those cases, which typically involved homicide and rape, the screening attorney
made the charging decision for the office. Id. at 63-64.
82
See, e.g., id. at 63 (noting that all screening attorneys in the New Orleans District
Attorney’s Office “served previously (usually a couple of years) in the Trial Section”).
83
See id. at 104 n.290 (acknowledging that in “some systems, the same attorney screens and
tries (or negotiates) the case”). See also Telephone Interview with Individual K, Current
Prosecutor (July 8, 2015) (describing such a practice in a large Midwestern county
prosecutor’s office).
84
See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice
system, the Government retains broad discretion as to whom to prosecute.”).
81
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put it, “[n]o government official in America has as much unreviewable
power and discretion as the prosecutor.” 85 The Supreme Court has placed
few limits on how prosecutors exercise their charging discretion,
concluding that a prosecutor’s “decision to prosecute is particularly illsuited to judicial review.” 86
The primary constraint is that the prosecutor must have “probable
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by [the
applicable] statute.” 87 Probable cause, however, is not a particularly
demanding standard. The Court has also imposed two other limitations—
prohibitions on “selective prosecution” 88 and “vindictive prosecution” 89—
but neither is particularly confining. In short, prosecutors are generally free
to exercise their charging discretion and the “awesome” power that entails
however they please. 90
Given today’s extensive criminal codes, prosecutors will typically
have multiple options when choosing how to charge a particular course of
conduct. 91 This Article focuses on a prosecutor’s decision to file a felony
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 960 (2009); see also, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration:
Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 Va. L. Rev. 271, 272 (2013) (“[Prosecutors]
have almost unlimited and unreviewable power to select the charges that will be brought
against defendants.”); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243,
1244 (2011).
86
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
87
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). For an interesting discussion about the
Supreme Court’s “missed opportunity” in Bordenkircher, see William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 840-42 (2006).
88
A prosecutor engages in selective prosecution when her decision to prosecute is
“deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.” Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608. Proving such a violation, however, is extremely
difficult. Selective prosecution claims are judged according to “ordinary equal protection
standards,” which means the defendant must establish that he was treated differently from
others and that the prosecutor’s decision was “motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-09; see also Pamela Cothran, Prosecutorial Discretion, 82 GEO. L.J.
771, 774 (1994) (observing that a “prosecutor's decision to bring charges rarely violates the
Equal Protection Clause”).
89
The Supreme Court has narrowly defined what conduct qualifies as unconstitutionally
vindictive. In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the
government could not “retaliate” against a defendant for invoking his right to appeal a
conviction “by substituting a more serious charge for the original one” upon remand from
the appellate court. Critically, the Court has carefully distinguished post-appeal retaliation
from “a pretrial decision to modify the charges against the defendant.” United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982). Specifically, the Court has expressly held that “a
prosecutor may file additional charges [before trial] if an initial expectation that a
defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded.” Id. As a result,
vindictive prosecution claims are effectively limited to instances of post-trial retaliation.
Id. at 381-82.
90
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977).
91
See, e.g., Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2549.
85
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charge or misdemeanor charge. That choice is particularly important.
Among other things, this initial decision has a lasting impact: cases usually
finish on the same side of the felony-misdemeanor line as where they
began. 92
As Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen detailed in their studies of
North Carolina felony prosecutions, prosecutors and defense attorneys in
felony cases “treat the felony-misdemeanor line as a major hurdle to
cross.” 93 According to Wright and Engen, only 25% of cases initially
charged as felonies end in a misdemeanor conviction. 94 The felonymisdemeanor hurdle is especially high when the jurisdiction’s criminal code
contains multiple felony grade options for the same core offense. “In these
areas of greatest depth,” Wright and Engen observed, “the criminal code is
structured to make prosecutors especially reluctant to cross the felonymisdemeanor line.” 95 They found that when there were three or more
felony grade options for an offense, a mere 12% of felony cases ended with a
misdemeanor conviction only. 96
Similarly, cases that begin as misdemeanor prosecutions rarely turn
into felonies. For example, as Issa Kohler-Hausmann documented in her
discerning study of New York City, only 0.2% of cases in that jurisdiction
that had a top arrest charge of a misdemeanor ended in a felony
disposition. 97
See Telephone Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015). There are
likely several reasons for these phenomena. Among other things, misdemeanor cases and
felony cases are often handled by different sets of prosecutors and processed by entirely
different trial courts. See infra notes __ and accompanying text. In other words,
institutional inertia likely plays a role. With respect to cases that start as felony
prosecutions, prosecutors likely do not make a habit of reducing felony cases to
misdemeanors because of concerns related to the setting of plea market prices. If felonies
were routinely reduced to misdemeanors, then that would become the expectation of
future defendants charged with felonies (or, more precisely, their attorneys), thereby
weakening a prosecutor’s standard bargaining position. With respect to cases that start as
misdemeanor prosecutions, increasing the charges to a felony would often require
satisfying additional procedural requirements—such as approval by a grand jury. In
addition, misdemeanor prosecutors would likely need to obtain supervisor approval to
bump the case up to a felony. See Telephone Interview with Individual D, Current
Prosecutor (June 8, 2015). Both considerations likely have a chilling effect on prosecutors
contemplating turning a misdemeanor charge into a felony one.
93
Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 9, 10 (2007).
94
See id. at 24-28; see Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and
Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1935 (2006).
95
Wright & Engen, Charge Movement, supra note __, at 27-28.
96
See id. at 24-28.
97
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 651 n.108 (2014) (456 out of more than 226,000 dispositions). Kohler-Hausmann’s data
is keyed off cases where the top arrest charge was a misdemeanor, rather than where the
92
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B.

Efficiency Gains

The strongest incentive prosecutors have for pursuing a case as a
misdemeanor rather than a felony is that misdemeanors are typically much
less costly to prosecute. 98 Prosecutors and their offices have two obvious
reasons for wanting to resolve cases as efficiently as possible. 99 First,
efficient resolution “free[s] up prosecutors to pursue many more cases,”
thereby serving the general mission of the office. 100 Second, all prosecutors,
but especially those managing bloated caseloads, have “personal incentives
to reduce their workloads.” 101
It is therefore unsurprising that several prosecutors I interviewed 102
acknowledged that concerns about resource constraints often play an
top initial charge by the prosecution was a misdemeanor. But there is little reason to think
that the latter would meaningfully differ from the former. Indeed, several prosecutors I
interviewed confirmed it was “rare” for a case initially filed as a misdemeanor to finish as a
felony. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015)
(describing East Coast urban jurisdiction); Telephone Interview with Individual K, Former
Prosecutor (July 8, 2015) (describing Midwestern urban jurisdiction).
98
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015)
(explaining that felony prosecutions are more time-intensive and resource-intensive);
Telephone Interview with Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) (same).
99
While prosecutors are surely influenced by concerns about efficiency, I do not mean to
suggest that is their only source of motivation. See infra notes __ (identifying conviction
rates, potential penalties, and public safety as additional factors). Indeed, a definitive and
comprehensive answer to what prosecutors maximize has proven elusive. See, e.g., Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2554 & n.6 (“There is as yet no developed social science
literature on what prosecutors maximize, probably because the solution is too complex to
model effectively.”); Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’
Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2014) (“Unfortunately, even though we understand
much about what prosecutors do, we know remarkably little about why they do it.”). The
point is simply that efficiency is one of several important considerations.
100
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2471 (2004).
101
Id.; see also, e.g., Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1122, 1140-41 (explaining that
prosecutors are “interested in reducing their own administrative costs” and “avoid[ing]
process and work, where possible”).
Notice that if the prosecutor making the initial charging decision is a line attorney
moonlighting as a screener, she may have additional incentive to charge a borderline case
as a misdemeanor—and thereby shift future responsibility for the case to a separate
prosecutor in the office rather than adding another felony case to her own caseload. This is
especially likely for cases where the evidence appears to be relatively weak (and therefore
less likely to plead quickly) or if the case appears to require disproportionate time and
attention. See Telephone Interview with Individual C, Former Prosecutor (July 22, 2015)
(describing such decisions).
102
I conducted semi-structured interviews with eleven current or former prosecutors. See,
e.g., Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 881 n.103 (2014)
(describing semi-structured interview technique and citing examples of its use in law
review literature). In exchange for their candor, I agreed to keep the interviewees’
identities confidential and their responses anonymous. The interviews were conducted
over the phone and each typically lasted about one hour.
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important role in charging decisions. 103 For example, a sensitivity to
resource constraints is one reason why screeners in some prosecutor’s
offices are required to seek supervisory approval before filing a felony
charge, but are not required to obtain such approval before filing a
misdemeanor charge. 104
Misdemeanors are typically less costly and less time-consuming to
prosecute because felony defendants possess a unique bundle of procedural
guarantees. 105 Critically, those procedural entitlements do not extend to
misdemeanor defendants charged with offenses that trigger serious
collateral consequences. As a result, prosecutors can pursue a severe
collateral consequence by filing a misdemeanor without triggering the
more-costly procedural safeguards associated with felony prosecutions.
1. Initial Felony Costs: Grand Juries and Preliminary Hearings
A key difference between felony and misdemeanor cases is the costs
prosecutors “must shoulder immediately” in felony cases, but not
misdemeanor ones. 106 “At the outset of felony cases, prosecutors typically
must present witnesses and evidence to establish probable cause to grand
To be clear, these interviews do not purport to represent a comprehensive
qualitative study. They nonetheless provide an instructive window into the practices
followed by a variety of prosecutor’s offices. The group of interviewees included
prosecutors that had served in federal and state court (and sometimes both); collectively
they had worked as a prosecutor in twelve different offices around the country. Eight of
the interviewees were male; three were female. Their average tenure as a prosecutor was
6.5 years, with length of service ranging from 1 year to 11 years.
103
When asked what factors prosecutors in their respective office typically considered
when deciding what charges to file in a given case, the prosecutors I interviewed repeatedly
highlighted resource constraints as one of three principal considerations. See, e.g.,
Telephone Interview with Individual F, Current Prosecutor (June 6, 2015) (admitting
“surprise” when first serving as a prosecutor about “how much resource constraints and
time constraints matter” during charging decisions and plea negotiations); Telephone
Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015); Telephone Interview with
Individual D, Current Prosecutor (June 8, 2015); Telephone Interview with Individual E,
Current Prosecutor (June 5, 2015); Telephone Interview with Individual G, Former
Prosecutor (June 5, 2015); Telephone Interview with Individual K, Current Prosecutor (July
8, 2015). The other two principal factors cited by the prosecutors I interviewed were
strength of the evidence and the defendant’s criminal history.
104
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Individual D, Current Prosecutor (June 8, 2015).
105
See, e.g., 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) (3d ed. 2014) (“Every
jurisdiction provides for some procedural differences based upon a distinction between
major and minor crimes.”); Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note __, at 1315-17. Of course,
some criminal procedure entitlements do apply across-the-board, regardless of an offense’s
relative severity. For example, in all cases the government must establish each element of
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). And several
trial rights, like those guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause, apply to all criminal
prosecutions—no matter how minor. See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 520 (2009).
106
Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note __, at 1713.
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juries or to judges at preliminary hearings.” 107 Prosecutors have no such
obligation in misdemeanor cases, even when a severe collateral
consequence is at stake.
The Federal Government 108 and 18 states 109 provide criminal
defendants the right to have felony charges—but only felony charges—
initiated by a grand jury. The remaining states provide prosecutors the
option of initiating felony charges either by filing an information or by
seeking an indictment from a grand jury. 110 In these jurisdictions,
prosecutors overwhelmingly prefer the information option—indicating
that, when given the choice, prosecutors tend to avoid the more
burdensome grand jury process. 111 In all jurisdictions, prosecutors may
initiate misdemeanor cases without proceeding before a grand jury.
To be sure, there are many instances where a prosecutor will
happily—even thankfully—invoke the powers of the grand jury for
investigatory purposes. But for many more cases, the grand jury
requirement is just an additional cost of doing felony business. Even in
jurisdictions where grand juries rarely decline to indict, the grand jury
requirement still imposes meaningful costs on the prosecutor’s office,
including the costs related to prosecutor time and grand jury time. Even if
one accepts the familiar adage that a prosecutor could get a grand jury to
indict a ham sandwich, it is nevertheless the case that a prosecutor would
often prefer to charge that ham sandwich by information rather than
Id.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 tracks the requirements
of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that, subject to limited exceptions, “[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has long
interpreted “infamous crime” as one that authorizes an “infamous punishment.” See, e.g.,
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885). The Supreme Court has further held that
infamous punishments include imprisonment in a penitentiary or imprisonment for any
period of time at hard labor. See United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922). Because
federal law has traditionally limited imprisonment in a penitentiary to offenders sentenced
to incarceration for more than one year, only persons convicted of a felony under federal
law could potentially be sentenced to a penitentiary. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM.
PROCEDURE § 15.1(b) (3d ed. 2014); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4083.
109
See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 15.1(d) (3d ed. 2014). Although there is
some variance in how each state defines the category of offenses requiring indictment by a
grand jury, the effective rule for those 18 states and D.C. is that indictments are only
necessary for felony offenses (i.e., those offenses where potential imprisonment exceeds
one year). See id. (explaining the various ways in which those jurisdictions have defined
the category of offenses for which a defendant is entitled to a grand jury).
110
See id. § 15.1(g). Because the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause has not been
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, state criminal
defendants have no federal constitutional right to a grand jury. See Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884). It is accordingly up to each state whether to require a grand jury for
certain criminal prosecutions.
111
See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 15.1(g).
107

108
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indictment. And if an office has thousands of ham sandwiches to process,
the more that can be charged by information the better.
Where felony cases can be initiated by information instead of
indictment, prosecutors must still bear the cost of a preliminary hearing. 112
A preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding conducted by a judicial
officer relatively early in the adjudicatory process that inquires whether
there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the relevant
offense. The government typically needs to establish probable cause in
order for the case to proceed any further. 113 In addition to serving as an
initial screening mechanism, 114 preliminary hearings often provide valuable
information about the prosecution’s case to the defense team at a relatively
early stage in the life of a case. 115 Like the right to a grand jury, however, the
right to a preliminary hearing is typically reserved only for felony
defendants. 116
Critically, no jurisdiction appears to consider an offense’s potential
collateral consequences when determining whether a defendant has a right
to a grand jury or a preliminary hearing. As a result, the fact that a
misdemeanor may carry a severe collateral consequence does not trigger
the initial procedural costs associated with felony prosecutions.
2. Felony Discovery Costs
Defendants charged with felonies also typically receive more ample
discovery than defendants charged with misdemeanors. 117 This is usually
through a combination of additional mandatory discovery requirements
being imposed on the government in a felony case, and the defendant
having more mechanisms for developing discovery in felony cases. 118 As a
In those jurisdictions that require felonies to be initiated by a grand jury, or permit
prosecutors to choose between information and indictment, preliminary hearings are
typically rendered unnecessary once the grand jury has returned an indictment. See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a)(2); 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE §§ 14.2(c), 14.2(d) (3d
ed. 2014).
113
See, e.g., id.
114
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Individual K, Current Prosecutor (July 8, 2015)
(identifying preliminary hearings as one of the reasons felonies are more burdensome to
prosecute, in part because they are “one more evidentiary hearing you have to do”).
115
See, e.g., Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2494-95 (observing that, “in some
states, preliminary hearings reveal much of the prosecution’s evidence to defense lawyers
in time for bargaining”).
116
See, e.g., William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into the Fourth
Amendment Equations—Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 38 KAN. L. REV. 439, 511 n.302 (1990). One exception is Utah, which requires
preliminary hearings for some misdemeanors as well. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM.
PROCEDURE § 14.2(d) at n.59.1 (3d ed. 2014).
117
See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note __, at 511 & n.300.
118
See, e.g., 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) (3d ed. 2014) (“Pretrial
discovery is also likely to be different [for felony and misdemeanor defendants], with such
discovery considerably narrower as to misdemeanor defendants. Similarly, pretrial
112
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result, felony prosecutors are often forced to endure the additional costs of
heightened discovery obligations—costs that add up quickly for prosecutors
managing swollen caseloads. Additional discovery requirements can also
reduce some of the government’s bargaining power during plea
negotiations, especially if the additional disclosures would force the
prosecutor to lay bare evidentiary weak spots. (This is yet another reason
why borderline cases with evidentiary concerns might get routed to the
misdemeanor track.)
The degree to which felony defendants are afforded more discovery
varies across jurisdictions. In the federal system, for example, most (though
not all) discovery rules apply equally to defendants facing misdemeanor
charges as those facing felony charges. 119 Many state jurisdictions, however,
create significant disparities in how discovery is handled in felony and
misdemeanor cases.
For example, several states that require “open file” discovery do so
only in cases involving felony offenses. In Arizona, for instance, only felony
defendants are entitled to receive at the outset of the prosecution “[a]ll then
existing original and supplemental reports prepared by a law enforcement
agency in connection with the particular crime with which the defendant is
charged.” 120 Similarly, in North Carolina, a pioneering state for open file
discovery, only felony defendants are entitled to the wealth of materials
made available by such disclosure requirements. 121
Some jurisdictions that do not require open file discovery also make
significant distinctions between felony and misdemeanor offenses. In
Georgia, for example, state law provides more expansive discovery
regarding statements made by the defendant to members of law
enforcement in felony prosecutions than in misdemeanor prosecutions. 122
Moreover, Georgia prosecutors in felony cases must disclose to the
defendant more information regarding potential witnesses and witness
statements than is required in misdemeanor cases. 123
While many jurisdictions create differing discovery obligations for
felony and misdemeanor prosecutions, I am not aware of any jurisdiction
procedures for developing evidence (e.g., depositions) and for sharpening the issues at trial
(e.g., the bill of particulars or pretrial conferences) are likely to be restricted (or simply
unavailable) in the process applicable to minor offenses.”); id. § 20.2(c) at nn.43-44.
119
See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. But see Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c)(3) (making distinction
between felony and misdemeanor offenses for purposes of depositions taken outside the
United States).
120
See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1
121
See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§15A-901, 15A-903.
122
Compare Ga. Code Ann. § 17-16-4 with Ga. Code Ann. § 17-16-22.
123
Compare Ga. Code Ann. § 17-16-8(a) and § 17-16-7(a) with Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 17-16-20 to
23. Similarly, only in felony prosecutions must the government disclose before trial any
“[s]tatements of coconspirators that are attributable to the defendant and arguably
admissible against the defendant at trial.” See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-16-4(a).
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where the discovery rules are altered based on an offense’s potential
collateral consequences.
3. Potential Future Costs: Right to a Jury Trial
A final set of procedural guarantees that varies across offense types is
a defendant’s right to demand a jury trial. According to the Supreme Court,
the right to a jury trial provides the defendant “an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.” 124 From the perspective of the prosecutor,
however, a jury trial is often unwelcome.
For starters, jury trials take longer to complete than bench trials.
Jury trials require additional time for jury selection, jury instructions, and
lengthier opening and closing statements. According to one analysis of
federal prosecutions, jury trials on average took four-times longer to
complete than bench trials. 125 As one former prosecutor I interviewed
pithily put it: “a two-hour bench trial becomes a three-day event with a
jury.” 126
But the costs associated with the trial itself are only part of the
equation. Jury trials often require prosecutors to engage in more intensive
preparation than do bench trials, and frequently entail more pretrial
litigation over procedural and evidentiary issues. 127 In sum, offenses that
result in a jury trial are substantially more costly to prosecute than those
that end with a bench trial. 128

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Blackstone described trial by jury as the
“grand bulwark” of English liberties. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999)
(quoting Blackstone).
125
See Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.12 (2006).
126
Telephone Interview with Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015)
127
See Segal & Stein, surpa note __, at 1514-15 (observing that jury trials “involve more
ancillary litigation over procedural and evidentiary issues than bench trials”). See also, e.g.,
Telephone Interview with Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) (explaining that
preparation for jury trials is typically more extensive than preparation for bench trials).
128
It is true, of course, that few cases ultimately reach an actual trial—jury or bench. But
when prosecutors are making initial charging decisions, they do not always know in
advance which cases will be the ones that go to trial and which ones will be resolved short
of trial. This is particularly true for low-level offenses where the threatened incarceration
is rarely exorbitant. Furthermore, defendants facing a severe collateral consequence (e.g.,
deportation) may be especially inclined to litigate instead of pleading guilty, since they
have relatively little to lose. See Telephone Interview with Individual D, Current
Prosecutor (June 8, 2015) (observing that defendants in one large East Coast jurisdiction
typically “won’t plead” to an offense that renders a non-citizen removable). Thus,
prosecutors must charge a case with an eye towards who the ultimate adjudicator will be in
the event the case does eventually go to trial. See id. (explaining that “potential jury
appeal” is a factor prosecutors typically consider when making initial charging decisions,
especially if there is reason to believe the case might ultimately go to trial).
124
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It is no surprise, therefore, that several studies have documented
prosecutors’ preference for bench trials instead of jury trials. For example,
Issa Kohler-Hausmann observed that the “standard practice” for
misdemeanor prosecutors in New York City was, on the eve of trial, to
reduce any Class A misdemeanor charges (which do trigger the right to a
jury trial in New York City) to Class B misdemeanor charges (which do not)
in order “to ensure a bench trial.” 129 Put simply, “by withholding the jury
trial right governments gain a major strategic advantage, depriving
defendants of the option to threaten exercise of the right, with its
associated adverse impact on dockets and justice system resources.” 130
Given prosecutors’ preferences to avoid jury trials—and the threat of
jury trials—when feasible, it is important to understand when a defendant
has a right to a jury trial. Under the Sixth Amendment, all felony
defendants but only some misdemeanor defendants have a federal
constitutional right to demand a jury trial. A misdemeanor defendants
charged only with “petty” offenses has no federal constitution right to a jury
trial. 131 The current lodestar for determining whether an offense is petty is
the potential term of imprisonment it authorizes. 132 An offense that
threatens more than six months imprisonment is always considered serious
129
See Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note __, at 659 n.133, 662 n.142; see also
M. Chris Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in “Zero-Tolerance” Policing
Regimes, 36 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Social Change 351, 372 n.106 (2012) (observing the same
practice in the context of misdemeanor trespass prosecutions). Class A misdemeanors
authorize up to one year imprisonment, whereas Class B misdemeanors authorize only up
to three months imprisonment. See N.Y. Penal Code §§ 70.15(1)-(2). This practice has been
upheld by New York courts, primarily on the grounds that the “District Attorney has
almost unfettered discretion in determining how and when to prosecute, including the
right to reduce, add or amend charges.” People v. Williams, 120 Misc.2d 68, 78-79 (Crim.
Ct. N.Y.C. 1983); see People v. Urbaez, 10 N.Y.3d 773 (Ct. App. 2008).
Such dedication to avoiding a jury trial whenever possible is by no means limited
to New York. See, e.g., Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the
Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 475-77 (2007)
(explaining practice in District of Columbia where prosecutors invariably charge
“attempted threats rather than threats”—even if the alleged conduct was a completed
threat—“because [only] the lesser crime of attempted threats does not provide sufficient
time of imprisonment to warrant a jury trial”).
130
Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the
Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 157-58 (2009).
131
See, e.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
132
See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42. The Court previously “focused on the nature of the
offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law.” Id. at 541 (citing District of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-57 (1888)); see also
Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 133 (1997) (tracing the Court’s various approaches to the petty offense exception over
time). According to the Court, it shifted its attention to an offense’s potential term of
imprisonment because that is a “more objective indication[] of the seriousness with which
society regards the offense.” Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541.
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and, therefore, automatically triggers a defendant’s right to trial by jury. 133
Conversely, an offense that carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six
months or less is presumed to be petty. 134 The presumption is rebutted,
and the defendant has a right to a jury trial, if “he can demonstrate that any
additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum
authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a
legislative determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one.” 135
Notably, the Supreme Court has thus far limited its “legislative
determination” inquiry to the legislature that enacted the offense. 136 This is
significant since other sovereigns—such as the federal government—may
impose “additional statutory penalties” upon conviction. 137
While a number of states follow the federal constitutional baseline
when determining the scope of a defendant’s right to a jury trial, many
others exceed the constitutional floor and provide more expansive jury trial
rights. 138 Several states, for example, require a trial by jury for all offenses
that authorize any amount of potential imprisonment. 139 And some
jurisdictions provide all criminal defendants a right to a jury trial. 140
As for the relevance of an offense’s collateral consequences, the
Supreme Court’s reference to “additional statutory penalties” in Blanton
appears to suggest that at least some collateral consequences may be
pertinent when determining whether a defendant has a federal
constitutional right to a jury trial. 141 Since Blanton, however, several
significant collateral consequences have been deemed irrelevant by courts
when deciding whether a presumptively petty offense is, in fact, serious for
See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542.
See id. at 543. The Supreme Court has also clarified that the critical inquiry is whether
any single offense authorizes a term of imprisonment in excess of six months. In Lewis v.
United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323-24 (1996), the Court held that “no jury trial right exists
where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses,” even if “the aggregate prison
term authorized for the offenses exceeds six months.” Id. at 323-24. As a result, a
prosecutor that carefully engages in misdemeanor charge stacking, see infra notes __ and
accompanying text, can avoid triggering a defendant’s right to a jury trial.
135
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. In Blanton, the Court predicted that it would be the “rare
situation where a legislature packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with onerous penalties that
nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line.” Id. at 543; see also United
States v. Nachitgal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (repeating the “rare case” observation made in
Blanton). Notably, the Court made these predictions when fewer collateral consequences
were triggered by misdemeanor offenses than is the case today.
136
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-44, 545 n.11.
137
See supra note __.
138
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note __, at 172-73.
139
See, e.g., id.
140
See, e.g., id.
141
See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. In Blanton, the Court concluded that an automatic 90-day
license suspension imposed for a DUI conviction did not rebut the presumption of
pettiness.
133

134
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Sixth Amendment purposes. Federal and state courts have repeatedly
concluded that a requirement to register as a sex offender is immaterial to
the calculus. This conclusion has primarily rested on the assertion that sex
offender registration is not formally a criminal punishment but rather a
“remedial, collateral consequence of the conviction.” 142 Similarly, state
courts have consistently ignored the deportation consequences of a
conviction when deciding whether an offense is petty or serious. 143 And
state courts have also held that a federal firearm ban—such as the one for
persons convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense—is
irrelevant because it was Congress that enacted the firearm prohibition, not
the applicable state legislature. 144
In sum, as was the case with grand juries, preliminary hearings, and
enhanced discovery obligations, prosecutors can often avoid triggering a
defendant’s right to a jury trial by filing a misdemeanor charge instead of a
felony one.
C.

Increasing (Or At Least Not Decreasing) The Likelihood
of Conviction

According to many scholars, “prosecutors consistently function as
conviction maximizers.” 145 Regardless of whether prosecutors are in fact
See, e.g., People v. Wrighton, 82 A.D.3d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2011); People v.
Danthuluri, 31 Misc.3d 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2011); People v. Shewbarran, 188 Misc.2d
595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C.C.A.
2008). Some courts have also refused to consider a requirement to register as a sex
offender because the jurisdiction imposing that obligation is different from the one
prosecuting the offense. See, e.g., Ivy v. United States, 2010 WL 1257729 (W.D. Ky. March
26, 2010); Rauch v. United States, 2007 WL 2900181 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007). Notably, one
state’s supreme court has held as a matter of state law that being required to register as a
sex offender does transform a presumptively petty offense into a serious one, thereby
entitling the defendant to a trial by jury. See Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2008).
143
See, e.g., Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial District of the State of Nevada, 319 P.3d 602 (Nev.
2014) (holding that deportation, which “arise[s] out of federal law,” is “not relevant” to the
jury trial inquiry because it does “not reflect a determination by the Nevada Legislature
that first-offense domestic battery is a serious offense”); Olafisoye v. United States, 857
A.2d 1078 (D.C.C.A. 2004) (concluding that the collateral consequence of “administrative
deportation proceedings do not raise an otherwise petty offense to the level requiring a
jury trial”).
144
See, e.g., Amezcua, 319 P.3d 602 (Nev. 2014). Federal courts have generally considered
firearm prohibitions, but most have concluded that it is not sufficiently severe to render an
offense “serious.” See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We hold
that the prohibition of firearm possession by persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence is not so serious as to entitle them to a jury trial for a presumptively
petty offense.”); United States v. Jardee, 2010 WL 565242 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2010) (same);
United States v. Combs, 2005 WL 3262983 (D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2005) (same). But see United
States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (reaching opposite conclusion).
145
Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1128. For a small sampling of the many scholars that
assert prosecutors are conviction maximizers, see the sources cited in Bibas, Plea
Bargaining, supra note __, at 2471-72 nn.20-24 and Bowers, supra, at 1128 n.45.
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maximizing convictions or something else, 146 there is little doubt that
concerns about likelihood of conviction are often at the forefront of a
prosecutor’s mind when deciding what charges to pursue in a given case. 147
In a field where objective metrics for job success are thin, a prosecutor’s
“conviction rate” is often used as “the principal measure of prosecutorial job
performance.” 148 Thus, prosecutors concerned with career advancement (or
even just career stability) are likely to place a premium on their own winloss statistics. 149 And for offices where the chief prosecutor is elected, “the
need to maximize convictions will be an inescapable environmental
constraint.” 150 As Daniel Richman has explained, “[t]hose elections that are
contested are often fought on an incumbent’s win-loss record, and an
incumbent’s concerns in this regard will be felt by his subordinates.” 151 For
these reasons, prosecutorial office culture is often described as one
dominated by the mantra of “nondefeat.” 152
See supra note __.
See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 967 (1997). See also supra note __ (recounting that
prosecutors interviewed identified strength of the evidence as one of three principal
considerations for initial charging decisions).
148
Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note __, at 1710-11 & n.265; see also, e.g., Bowers, Punishing,
supra note __ at 1149 (“The conviction rate, after all, is the most visible rubric of quality job
performance.”); Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 106-07 (1968) (“Conviction statistics seem to most prosecutors a tangible measure
of their success.”).
149
See, e.g., Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2471 (observing that prosecutors “may
further their careers by racking up good win-loss records”); Robert L. Rabin, Agency
Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045 (1972) (“[C]onvictions are the central performance standard, and
departures from the average rate raise questions and create anxieties.”). As Stephanos
Bibas notes, “[f]avorable win-loss statistics” can also provide many psychic benefits,
including “boost[ing] prosecutors’ egos, their esteem, [and] their praise by colleagues.”
Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2471.
150
Richman, supra note __, at 967.
151
Id. This is not to suggest that appointed prosecutors care less about win-loss statistics
than their elected peers. But the vast majority of chief prosecutors in the United States are
elected, and the prospect of a future election is a variable unique to those offices. See, e.g.,
Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734
(1996) (observing that over 95 percent of chief prosecutors at the state and local level are
elected); see also Steven W. Perry, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2005, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Bulletin (July 2006) (reporting that “[e]xcept for Alaska, Connecticut, the District
of Columbia, and New Jersey, all chief prosecutors in 2005 were elected officials”) (available
at: http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf).
152
Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1128 (“At bottom, prosecutors carry mindsets of
‘nondefeat’ . . . .”); see also, e.g., Richman, supra note __, at 968 (same); Meares, supra note
__, at 869 (noting that “an abhorrence of losing” “is central to prosecutorial culture”). For
an old but still oft-cited study detailing this phenomenon, see Jerome H. Skolnick, Social
Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52 (1967) (“In the county studied, the
prosecutor’s office cared less about winning than about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic
146
147
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In its purest form, concerns about likelihood of conviction are
trained on the strength of the evidence and whether the prosecutor thinks
the ultimate adjudicator—a judge or jury—is likely to enter a judgment of
conviction.
But concerns about likelihood of conviction can also
encompass other considerations, such as the likelihood that a particular set
of charges will induce a defendant to plead guilty. The strength of the
evidence (and how that evidence will be received by the ultimate
adjudicator) still plays a leading role there, but other factors may also be
relevant. 153
In some ways, the strength of the government’s case will be
minimally affected by whether the case is charged as a felony or a
misdemeanor. For example, the existence of incriminating physical
evidence, the content and credibility of potential witness testimony, and
the persuasiveness of certain defenses (such as an alibi) typically do not
turn on the nature of the charge.
To the extent the strength of the government’s case does vary,
however, it does so because of a difference in the elements of the offense
seeking to be proven. In this respect misdemeanors are almost always
easier to prove than felonies. Misdemeanors tend to have fewer elements
than their felony counterparts. 154 Relatedly, felonies typically have more
demanding injury or harm requirements than corresponding
misdemeanors. 155
Finally, felonies sometimes have heightened mens rea requirements
compared to misdemeanors. 156 Beyond simply being harder to prove,
to the rationale of the prosecutor’s office that one does not often hear it articulated.
Nevertheless it is very powerful.”).
153
See generally Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note __.
154
For example, under New York law, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the seventh degree—a misdemeanor—if he “knowingly and
unlawfully possesses a controlled substance.” See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.03. By contrast, in
order to prove that a person committed criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the fifth degree—a low-grade felony—the government must establish any one of several
additional elements, such as “intent to sell” the substance or that he possessed at least a
certain amount of the substance. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 (government must prove
one of eight additional elements). For those scoring at home, New York no longer has an
offense labeled criminal possession of a controlled substance in the sixth degree.
155
For example, under District of Columbia law, a person is guilty of felonious assault—and
faces up to three years imprisonment—if he “unlawfully assaults, or threatens another in a
menacing manner, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes significant bodily
injury to another.” See D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(2). “Significant bodily injury” is defined in
part as one that requires “immediate medical attention.” See id. Misdemeanor assault, by
contrast, has no significant bodily injury requirement. See D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(1).
156
For example, under New York law, a person is guilty of assault in the third degree—a
misdemeanor—if “with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.” See N.Y. Penal Code § 120.00(3). In
order to establish that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree—a low-grade
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heightened mens rea requirements can—depending on the jurisdiction—
unlock additional lines of defense for the defendant. For example, in most
jurisdictions, a defendant charged with a specific intent crime may claim
that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent. 157 But that same
defendant, if charged with an offense requiring only a general intent, will
likely be prohibited from mounting a voluntary intoxication defense. 158
Accordingly, if the prosecutor expects that voluntary intoxication may be a
credible line of defense, then he would have additional reason to consider
charging a lesser offense that requires only a general intent instead of a
higher grade offense that requires specific intent.
Another reason why a misdemeanor charge may have a higher
likelihood of conviction (or, equally important for present purposes, the
perception of a higher likelihood of conviction) in a particular case relates
to differences between a bench trial and a jury trial. 159 Generally speaking, a
defendant is more likely to be convicted after a bench trial than a jury trial.
There are of course exceptions to this observation, depending both on the
jurisdiction and the offense charged. But the best studies to date have
concluded that judges are more likely to convict than juries. 160 Perhaps
relatedly, judicial officers in most jurisdictions are subject to some form of
election. 161 Judges forced to navigate the perilous waters of electoral politics

felony—the government must instead prove that the defendant committed the assault
“with intent to cause physical injury to another person.” See N.Y. Penal Code § 120.05(2).
157
See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1996) (observing that a majority of American
jurisdictions permit a voluntary intoxication defense for specific intent crimes, but only
specific intent crimes); see also, e.g., State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012)
(explaining that voluntary intoxication defense is permissible for specific intent, but not
general intent, crimes).
158
See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 47-48; see also, e.g., Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 307. Some states do
not allow a voluntary intoxication defense to any offense. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 749
N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. 2001). But that is the minority position. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 48
n.2.
159
As noted earlier, some misdemeanor defendants lack the right to demand a jury trial.
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials
in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 971-76 (2011) (summarizing the
“considerable empirical and qualitative evidence that judges are more willing to convict
than juries”). But see Andrew D. Liepold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83
WASH. U. L. Q. 151 (2005) (exploring potential reasons why, since the late 1980s, acquittal
rates for federal judges outpace the acquittal rates for federal juries).
161
See Hon. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Why Habeas Review of State Court Convictions is
More Important than Ever, 24 FED. SENTENCING REPORTER 292, 292 & n.5 (April 2012) (“39
states permit voters to elect or retain judges.”). In fact, “eighty-seven percent of all state
judges stand for some form of election.” Id. (citing Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 149, 154 (1998)).
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may be more inclined to convict than a jury of the defendant’s peers, none
of whom face a future election challenge. 162
In some jurisdictions, including several that encompass the country’s
largest urban populations, juries have a well-earned reputation for being
particularly hostile to certain criminal prosecutions. For example, the socalled “Bronx jury” became famous (or infamous) after juries in the Bronx
consistently returned acquittals at a rate far above the national average. 163
The Bronx is far from alone on that score, and there is evidence of
significantly higher acquittal rates in the District of Columbia, Baltimore,
Detroit, and Los Angeles—just to name a few. 164 This phenomenon has
been explained as the inevitable byproduct of drawing a jury pool from
“communities that harbor such profound and problematic systemic
distrust” of law enforcement. 165 Regardless of the reason, prosecutors in
such jurisdictions are likely to believe that avoiding the prospect of a jury
trial will significantly increase the odds of conviction. 166
Even when the defendant has a right to a jury trial, the nature of that
right often varies depending on whether he has been charged with a felony
or a misdemeanor. While nearly every state has 12 jurors sit on a felony
case, 167 many states have fewer jurors serve on misdemeanor cases. 168 For
example, in Texas only six jurors sit on a “trial involving a misdemeanor
See, e.g., id. at 292-94 (discussing various examples where judicial campaigns focused on
an incumbent’s record in criminal cases); Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial
Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 201-02 (1996) (“Crime
in general has become more of a high profile issue in political discourse, and no politician
wants to be classified as ‘soft on crime.’ Elected judges are no exception.”). See generally
Joanna Cohn Weiss, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal
Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (2006).
163
See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 N.W. U. L. REV. 877, 899900 (1999).
164
See, e.g., Marder, supra note __, at 900 n.114. Prosecutors may also sometimes believe
that jurors have skewed expectations about the level of evidence necessary to satisfy the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. For example, much has been made of the so-called
“CSI effect” on juries. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt:
Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006). While there is
no evidence confirming that the CSI effect is an actual phenomenon, it remains a widelyshared perception among many government officials.
165
Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 110 n.119 (2007).
166
See Telephone Interview with Individual D, Current Prosecutor (June 8, 2015)
(acknowledging that, in a jurisdiction where the jury pool is understood to be generally
distrustful of law enforcement, cases perceived to “not play well before a jury” were more
likely to be charged as a misdemeanor in order to have a bench trial, even if that meant
“the charging decision does not always line up with the brutality of the crime”); see also
Telephone Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015); Telephone
Interview with Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015).
167
See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 22.1(d) at n.79 (3d ed. 2014) (observing
that only “six states authorize juries of less than 12 in felony cases”).
168
See id.
162
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offense.” 169 And some states permit even fewer than six jurors in petty
offense cases (where the federal constitutional requirement of a six-juror
minimum does not apply). 170 Smaller juries tend to favor the prosecution. 171
This is yet another reason a prosecutor may prefer charging a misdemeanor
instead of a felony.
Finally, regardless of whether the ultimate adjudicator is a judge or a
jury, a “rich body of empirical and experimental studies indicates” that “fact
finders adjust the burden of proof in accordance with the size of the
applicable sanction.” 172 Specifically, studies show that “judges and jurors
often elevate the probative threshold for conviction as the severity of the
punishment increases.” 173 Because felonies carry more punishment than
misdemeanors, these studies suggest that the fact finder will be less likely to
convict—even if marginally—for the felony than for the misdemeanor. 174
When it comes to the likelihood of inducing a guilty plea, the
relative strength of a prosecutor’s case will have a significant effect on the
negotiations. Thus, for all the reasons just discussed, a prosecutor’s case
will often appear stronger when viewed through the lens of a misdemeanor.
But there are other relevant considerations, and those additional
factors present more of a mixed bag. For example, the threat of increased
incarceration associated with a felony charge may give additional leverage
to the prosecutor seeking to induce a plea. The actual difference in
expected prison time, however, can often be relatively small, thereby
minimizing the effectiveness of that threat. 175
See Tex. Code of Crim. P. Art. 33.01(b).
See, e.g., Utah Code § 78B-1-104 (four jurors sit on petty misdemeanor cases). If a
defendant enjoys a federal constitutional right to a jury trial, the jury must include at least
six persons. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional a fiveperson jury in a non-petty offense case).
171
See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 332 (1980) (“[S]tatistical and empirical data
established that because of a concomitant decrease in the number of hung juries, a
reduction in the size of the jury panel in criminal cases unfairly disadvantages one side—
the defense.”); see also id. at 332 n.10 (identifying three reasons why smaller juries tend to
favor the prosecution).
172
Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent, 110
MICH. L. REV. 597, 598 (2012); see id. at 601-07 (surveying studies).
173
Id.; see also Richman, supra note __, at 972 & n.115 (1997) (collecting studies).
174
See Cade, supra note __, at 1795 (“Studies have suggested that adjudicators convict on
less evidence where defendants are charged with minor offenses or face less severe criminal
sanctions.”). Even though a jury is typically not aware of the specific penalties at stake, it
will likely have a sense of the relative severity of an offense based on its name alone. Many
offenses, for example, indicate whether they are a felony or a misdemeanor. And some,
such as aggravated assault versus simple assault, can clue-in an otherwise unfamiliar jury.
175
See infra notes __ and accompanying text. Vertical overcharging is most potent when
the potential “trial penalty”—the difference between a post-trial sentence and guilty plea
sentence—is especially severe. For many low-grade felonies, however, the potential trial
penalty will not be exorbitant, since the maximum term of incarceration is typically only a
few years.
169
170
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In addition, a defendant facing a felony charge can threaten to
impose more procedural and administrative demands on the prosecutor
than he could if he were charged only with a misdemeanor. 176 As Josh
Bowers has correctly recognized, the defense team typically enjoys one
significant “advantage over the prosecutor: the defendant has a ‘call’ on the
prosecutor’s time.” 177 Felony defendants can almost always “call” more of a
prosecutor’s time than can misdemeanor defendants—meaning the threat
to do so is more powerful when coming from a felony defendant. 178 And
defendants facing one of the severe collateral consequences highlighted
here, such as deportation or sex offender registration, may be especially
inclined to fight the charges to the bitter end—and therefore be perceived
at the time of charging as someone more likely to actually call the
prosecutor’s time. 179
Potential differences in counsel may also play a role. A felony
defendant is likely to have better and more experienced counsel, plus an
attorney with superior resources and opportunity to investigate, file
motions, and actually bargain with the prosecutor. 180 Misdemeanor
defendants, by contrast, are often lucky to get their lawyer’s individual
attention for more than a few minutes. And those lawyers are usually so
overburdened that independent investigation and case analysis are often
the exception rather than the rule. 181
In the end, whether a felony or misdemeanor charge is more likely to
induce a plea will probably vary from case to case. But more often than not,
the government’s case is likely to be viewed as stronger—in terms of
likelihood of conviction at trial—if charged as a misdemeanor rather than a
felony. That fact alone means prosecutors will not reflexively choose the
felony charge, assuming the misdemeanor offense also provides an
adequate penalty (including the pertinent collateral consequence) upon
conviction.
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1151.
178
As Bowers points out, “[t]he best defense tool in the face of an atypically high price
then—or even just a price that the defendant does not particularly like—is to create the
perception that the defendant is willing to engage her own process costs.” Id. at 1151-52.
Because felony cases have more process costs, felony defendants generally have more
procedural chips with which to bargain.
179
See Telephone Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) (observing
that it was, on average, more difficult to secure a plea agreement when the defendant
would be facing deportation or sex offender registration); Telephone Interview with
Individual D, Current Prosecutor (June 8, 2015) (same); Telephone Interview with
Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) (same). See also Eagly, supra note __, at
1195-96 & nn.315-16 (reporting that noncitizen defendants in Harris County, Texas charged
with deportable offenses appear to be “disproportionately inclined to take their cases to
trial”).
180
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
181
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
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D.

The (Minimal) Penalty Sacrifice

The primary concession prosecutors make when filing a
misdemeanor instead of a felony is foregoing the additional penalties
offered by the felony offense—in particular the possibility of increased
incarceration. Before examining the degree to which expected prison time
differs between low-grade felonies and misdemeanors—and therefore how
much prison time prosecutors are actually surrendering when choosing the
misdemeanor offense—it is important to appreciate how prosecutors
typically approach the issue of potential penalties.
Prosecutors generally have a preferred penalty for each case. I do not
mean to suggest that prosecutors formally assign each case such a value.
But prosecutors routinely, even if only implicitly, have a rough idea of what
a case is “worth”—or, perhaps more precisely, what a defendant
“deserves”—in terms of appropriate penalties.
Critically, a prosecutor’s preferred penalty is seldom the most severe
one she can possibly seek under the law. Put another way, prosecutors
“rarely operate as sentence maximizers.” 182 In the words of Professor
Stuntz, “however prosecutors define their preferred sentence, there is no
good reason to assume that their preference is always the harshest sentence
they can possibly get.” 183 This is because, as Stuntz colorfully put it,
prosecutors “are not like civil plaintiffs: they are not paid by the conviction,
with bonuses for each additional month the defendant spends in prison.”184
“Once the defendant’s sentence has reached the level the prosecutor
prefers,” Stuntz observed, “adding more time offers no benefit to the
prosecutor.” 185
Perhaps the best evidence that prosecutors have preferred penalties,
and that those penalties are typically not the most severe available under
the law, is a series of studies that examined how prosecutors exercise their
charging discretion when navigating mandatory minimum sentences or
“three-strike” repeat offender laws. 186 In one such study, David Bjerk
demonstrated that after the imposition of a “three-strike” repeat offender
law, “prosecutors became almost twice as likely to prosecute three-strikes

Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1128; see also, e.g., Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note
__, at 2474. To the extent prosecutors ever act as sentence maximizers, it is only for those
offenses at the top of the severity ladder. See, e.g., Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1153
(“In serious cases, prosecutors drive harder bargains and aim for sentence maximization to
a greater degree.”). But those especially severe cases fall outside the scope of this Article.
183
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2553-54.
184
Id. at 2554.
185
Id.
186
See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025 at 26-29, in CRIME AND JUSTICE
IN AMERICA, 1975-2025 (Michael Tonry, ed. 2013) (summarizing “six major studies”).
182
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arrestees for lesser misdemeanor crimes not covered by the laws.” 187 Bjerk
also concluded that “such behavior [was] the result of prosecutors using
their discretion to partially circumvent three-strikes laws owing to [the
prosecutors’] own constraints and preferences, not simply in response to
changes in behavior by other actors within the judicial system.” 188 In other
words, prosecutors altered their charging behavior in order to achieve a
preferred penalty, and this was based on their own belief about what each
defendant deserved.
One further point bears mentioning. Recall that for low-level
offenses, prosecutors will often view the imposition of certain collateral
consequences—e.g., sex offender registration, firearm prohibitions,
deportation—to be as important, if not more important, than any term of
incarceration. For that reason, there are likely many cases where a
prosecutor is relatively indifferent to the amount of prison time imposed on
a defendant, so long as the collateral consequence is imposed. For example,
when a prosecutor is confronted with a low-grade sex offense, the most
important penalty is likely to be sex offender registration, not the prospect
of a few additional months in prison. 189
This also means that an inability to impose a particular collateral
consequence for a misdemeanor conviction might effectively take that
charging option off the table. But when the same collateral consequence is
available for a misdemeanor conviction as for a felony conviction, that
particular disincentive to pursuing a misdemeanor has been removed.
If the collateral consequence at issue can be imposed for both a
misdemeanor and a felony conviction, the main penalty difference between
the two is the length of incarceration. But while the maximum potential
prison terms authorized by each type of offense may be years apart, the
actual amount of incarceration imposed on a defendant for conduct that
could feasibly be charged as a misdemeanor or low-grade felony will often
differ much less.
First, a significant number of felony convictions result in little or no
actual jail time. 190 In 2006 (the most recent year reported by the Bureau of
David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 593 (2005).
188
Id.
189
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Individual I, Current Prosecutor (June 16, 2015)
(stating that sex offender registration “was the most important goal in sex cases” and that it
was “very rare to give [that penalty] up” in exchange for a guilty plea, but that she was
generally “willing to give up jail time and length of probation”); Telephone Interview with
Individual E, Current Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) (explaining that sex offender registration
was usually treated as non-negotiable in sex offense prosecutions and recounting cases
where she agreed to reduced terms of incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea that
included sex offender registration).
190
See, e.g., Chin, Defense Lawyers, supra note __, at 153; Bowers, Punishing, supra note __,
at 1145 n.139.
187

38

Justice Statistics), 31% of all state criminal defendants convicted of a felony
were sentenced to no term of imprisonment, and another 28% were
sentenced only to a local jail (which is typically reserved for defendants
incarcerated for less than one year). 191 The average prison sentence in state
courts that year for all felony defendants was about three years. 192 The
average prison sentence for defendants convicted only of low-grade felonies
was likely much less.
Second, even if a defendant convicted of a felony was sentenced to
incarceration for more than one year, it is not necessarily the case that the
defendant would actually serve that full amount of time before being
released. Defendants may obtain good time credits while in prison, which
can reduce the total period of incarceration in some jurisdictions by at least
one-third. 193
Third, some studies have indicated that courts with limited or
specialized jurisdiction—including many misdemeanor courts and domestic
violence
misdemeanor
courts—may
sentence
a
borderline
felony/misdemeanor case more harshly than would a general felony court
that routinely adjudicates more serious offenses. 194 According to scholars,
the differing responses stem from the courts’ differing baselines. The
borderline offense may appear relatively serious to a court where the typical
case is a petty offense, but that same conduct might appear relatively mild
to a court immersed in higher gravity cases. 195
Finally, if prosecutors are keen on seeking more than one year
imprisonment, they need not always file a felony charge to achieve that
goal. Instead, prosecutors can bring multiple misdemeanor charges—a
practice sometimes called “stacking”—and request that the prison
sentences for each convicted offense be served consecutively. 196 If
successful, the ultimate prison sentence could be well in excess of one year.
And, critically, the practice of stacking misdemeanors does not trigger the
See Sean Rosenmerkel et al., Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006-Statistical Tables,
Bureau of Justice Statistics (Dec. 2009; Revised Nov. 22, 2010), at page 2 (available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf).
192
See id.
193
See, e.g., Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1145 (“[U]nder New York law, defendants
serve only two-thirds of their sentenced jail time, calculated from the moment of arrest.”
(citing N.Y. Penal Law § 70.30)).
194
See, e.g., Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments (working paper).
195
See id. at 29 (“[W]hen recidivist domestic violence offenders in Chicago were charged
with felonies (at the Criminal Court) instead of misdemeanors [(at the Domestic Violence
Division)], the felony charges received lower sentences than those that would have been
ordered for equivalent misdemeanors by the Domestic Violence Court.”).
196
The ultimate effectiveness of such stacking will depend on whether the trial court orders
that the sentences for multiple convictions run consecutively or concurrently. Most states
“entrust to judges’ unfettered discretion the decision whether sentences for discrete
offenses shall be served consecutively or concurrently.” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163-64
(2009).
191
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bundle of procedural guarantees typically afforded defendants charged with
a felony.
In sum, while a low-grade felony prosecution could potentially lead
to a longer term of incarceration than a misdemeanor prosecution, the
difference in actual incarceration may often be relatively small—one that is
more likely to be measured in months rather than years.
*

*

*

The upshot of all this is that while prosecutors do forego additional
penalties by pursuing a misdemeanor case, that sacrifice may not be as
significant as it first appears. As a result, prosecutors often have strong
incentives to relinquish the possibility of additional incarceration in
exchange for the efficiency and likelihood of conviction gains that typically
accompany misdemeanor prosecutions. In cases where prosecutors care
primarily about the imposition of the collateral consequence, the
calculation is straightforward. Indeed, there is no real tradeoff at all. 197
III.

STRATEGIC UNDERCHARGING’S RIPPLE EFFECTS

At first glance, the choice to file a misdemeanor instead of a felony
may appear to be relatively insignificant. In a world of guilty pleas, one
might ask, what difference does it really make? But misdemeanor
prosecutions and felony prosecutions differ in critical ways, including in
ways that can affect a case’s ultimate disposition. 198 As already detailed,
misdemeanor defendants are typically afforded less procedural protections
than felony defendants. This Part examines some of the other ripple effects
caused by a prosecutor’s decision to engage in strategic undercharging. 199

Consider the following experience of a domestic violence prosecutor in a large,
Midwestern jurisdiction. According to this prosecutor, many domestic violence defendants
in his jurisdiction, especially first-time offenders, are unlikely to receive any term of
incarceration upon conviction, even when convicted of a felony. At the same time, his
office (like many others) prioritizes the imposition of firearm prohibitions in domestic
violence cases. Because the defendant’s expected prison “exposure” is often the same for a
felony as a misdemeanor, the prosecutor acknowledged that he sometimes files a
misdemeanor charge because the “defendant will get probation regardless,” “you still get
the gun out of the house,” and the “process is much quicker.” Telephone Interview with
Individual K, Current Prosecutor (July 8, 2015).
198
See generally Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note __; Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note
__.
199
The effects highlighted in this Part primarily relate to state prosecutions, not federal
ones. State prosecutions account for about 98% of all criminal prosecutions in the United
States. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 1.2(e) (3d ed. 2014).
197
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A.

Misdemeanor Courts

In most states, misdemeanors are adjudicated in different trial courts
than felonies. 200 While felony dockets have no shortage of cases,
misdemeanor courts are typically bursting at the seams. According to one
recent study, state trial courts of limited jurisdiction (those primarily
responsible for misdemeanor cases) handled more than three times as many
cases as state trial courts of general jurisdiction (those primarily responsible
for felony cases). 201 The docket disparity is even greater when one focuses
on criminal cases. In Washington, for example, state trial courts of limited
jurisdiction processed nearly 300,000 criminal cases in 2010, while state trial
courts of general jurisdiction processed about 38,500 criminal cases. 202
Other states experience similar disparities. 203
In 1972, the Supreme Court cautioned that “the volume of
misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions, may
create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the
result.” 204 A fixation on clearing dockets is likely even more pronounced
today, as there are now twice as many misdemeanors as there were in
1972. 205
See NACDL, Minor Crimes, supra note __, at 11; see also, e.g., Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AMER. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 351, 359 n.8
(2013).
201
R. LaFountain et al., Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court
Caseloads, at 3 (National Center for State Courts 2012) (available at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.as
hx). This figure includes all cases processed by the courts—criminal and civil.
202
See id. at 21. Because courts of limited jurisdiction also process preliminary felony
matters, some felony cases are “counted twice”—once in the court of limited jurisdiction
for the preliminary matter and again in the court of general jurisdiction for subsequent
proceedings. See id. at 19 (explaining methodology).
203
See, e.g., id. at 21 (courts of limited jurisdiction in Michigan processed 867,100 criminal
cases and courts of general jurisdiction processed 63,224 criminal cases).
204
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34; see id. at 34-35 (“An inevitable consequence of [such] volume
is the almost total preoccupation in such a court with the movement of cases.”).
205
In Argersinger, the Court estimated that there was between four and five million cases
involving misdemeanors. 407 U.S. at 34 n.4. Today the best estimates place that number
northward of ten million. See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note __, at 1320-21.
Much (though not all) of the increase is likely attributable to widespread adoption of a
policing strategy called “order maintenance” policing or the “broken windows” theory. See,
e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note __, at 639.
For a small but representative sampling of the extensive literature on order
maintenance policing and the broken windows theory, see James Q. Wilson & George L.
Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar.
1982) (introducing broken windows theory); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001); Bernard E. Harcourt &
Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); WILLIAM J. BRATTON & PETER KNOBBLER,
TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998).
200
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Given the pressures to process cases rapidly, 206 misdemeanor judges
must limit the amount of time they spend on any particular matter. 207 This
means less time for holding in-person hearings and instead deciding more
issues on the papers alone. This also means less time for engaging
defendants in searching plea colloquies, which are supposed to be the final
backstop for ensuring that there is a factual basis for the plea and a
knowing and voluntary waiver of various constitutional rights. 208
Misdemeanor courts, moreover, usually operate with their own pool
of judges. As Eve Brensike Primus has detailed, state “misdemeanor judges
often have smaller salaries and occupy positions of less prestige than their
felony counterparts. As a result, more qualified applicants are naturally
attracted to the felony courts.” 209 Moreover, in a “number of states, such as
Arizona, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania, some of the judges in these
[misdemeanor] courts are not lawyers.” 210 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
average difference between misdemeanor judges and felony judges—“both
in terms of the judges’ knowledge of the law and their receptivity to legal
arguments”—has been described by some as “astounding.” 211
B.

Misdemeanor Defense Counsel

Another key consequence of strategic undercharging relates to
defense counsel.
Misdemeanor defense attorneys are typically less
experienced than felony defense attorneys. 212 Among other things, this
means they have had comparatively less time to establish credibility with
local prosecutors—a trait that is often critical to counsel’s ability to plea
bargain effectively. 213
Among other things, docket clearance rate is a common component of judicial
performance evaluations. The National Center for State Courts, for example, has developed
ten criteria to measure court performance, and three of those criteria rate a judge’s ability
to effectively manage her docket. See NCSC, CourTools: Trial Court Performance Measures
(available at http://www.courtools.org/Trial-Court-Performance-Measures.aspx).
207
See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, XL FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 101 (2013).
208
See, e.g., id. at 130. As Natapoff notes, some courts have even taken to doing pleas en
masse. See id. at 130-31 (detailing practice in one Arizona court where judges routinely
presided over 50-to-70 defendants pleading guilty at once).
209
Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor Justice System: Its Problems and Some
Potential Solutions, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81 (2013).
210
See NACDL, Minor Crimes, supra note __, at 11.
211
Primus, supra note __, at 81. Moreover, because “felony convictions get appealed at
much higher rates than do misdemeanor convictions,” “misdemeanor judges are relatively
insulated from higher court feedback and do not learn of their mistakes in the same way
that felony trial court judges do.” Id.
212
See, e.g., Cade, supra note __, at 1787-88 (“[M]isdemeanor defenders typically have little
experience.”).
213
See, e.g., Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2534. Depending on the greenness of
the attorney, it may also mean that counsel is not yet aware of the various collateral
consequences that may attach upon conviction. For now at least, the Supreme Court has
206
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In addition, defense attorneys handling misdemeanors typically carry
greater caseloads than their felony colleagues. 214
The most widely
recognized caseload guidelines provide that defense attorneys should not
exceed 400 misdemeanor cases annually. 215 Many defense attorneys,
however, go far past that recommended limit. 216 One recent study found
that public defenders in Chicago, Atlanta, and Miami average more than
2000 misdemeanor cases per year. 217 That same study reported similar
excesses in a variety of other jurisdictions. 218
The defense attorneys managing these caseloads are usually public
defenders compensated by a fixed salary, or court appointed attorneys
operating under strictly-limited fee caps. 219 For the latter, the fees are
typically capped at a fraction of the funding allotted for felony cases. 220 In
Illinois, for example, payment to court-appointed counsel “may not exceed
$500 for a defendant charged with a misdemeanor” (yet may not exceed
“$5,000 for a defendant charged with a felony”). 221 The combination of a
demanding caseload with either a fixed salary or depressed fee caps can
have deleterious effects on an attorney’s ability and incentive to perform
the costly work of investigating potential defenses, filing motions,
negotiating with the prosecutor, or personally meeting with the defendant
limited the Sixth Amendment right it recognized in Padilla—“that counsel must inform her
client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation”—to the penalty of deportation. See
559 U.S. at 374. Accordingly, defense counsel’s failure to advise her client of other
potential collateral consequences of conviction is not a ground for a later ineffective
assistance claim.
214
See, e.g., Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, supra note __; Erica J. Hashimoto, The
Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 461, 468-75 (2007). Of
course, stifling defense caseloads are not unique to misdemeanor attorneys. See Roberts,
Ignorance, supra note __, at 146-47 (describing “crushing caseload conditions” facing felony
defense attorneys); Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004). That said, “individuals
facing misdemeanor charges are more likely to suffer the consequences of the workload
strain.” Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, supra note __, at 294.
215
See, e.g., Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, supra note __, at 295; Hashimoto, supra
note __, at 487 n.122, 504 n.180.
216
See, e.g., Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note __, at 1342-43; NACDL, Minor Crimes,
Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts at 21 (2009).
217
NACDL, Minor Crimes, supra note __, at 21.
218
See id. at 20-31.
219
Most misdemeanor defendants are indigent. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The
Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006)
(“Poor people account for more than 80% of individuals prosecuted.”).
220
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, supra note __, at 326-27 & n.214. Court appointed
attorneys are typically paid on a per-case basis. Cade, supra note __, at 1788.
221
See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/113-3.1(b). Curiously, the same statute provides that courtappointed counsel may receive up to “$2500 for a defendant who is appealing a conviction
of any class offense.” Id. In other words, counsel is entitled to five times as much funding
appealing a misdemeanor conviction as he is trying to avoid that conviction in the first
place.
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to discuss any number of pertinent issues (including potential
consequences of conviction). 222
This is particularly significant given that misdemeanor attorneys
typically receive much less “free” (or “low cost”) discovery than their felony
counterparts. 223 As a result, misdemeanor defense counsel must rely even
more on the fruits of their own investigation in order to assess the strength
of the government’s case. But, for the reasons noted, misdemeanor defense
attorneys will often be the ones least able to perform that critical task
Some misdemeanor defendants lack access to counsel altogether. 224
An indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor has a constitutional
right to government-provided counsel only if he is actually “sentenced to a
term of imprisonment.” 225 Nearly half of the states have exceeded that
federal floor and provide counsel to an indigent defendant if he is charged
with a misdemeanor that merely authorizes incarceration. But a significant
number of states still limit the right to counsel for at least some
misdemeanor offenses to those instances where imprisonment is actually
imposed. 226 As with other constitutional safeguards, an offense’s potential
collateral consequences are generally considered irrelevant when
determining whether the defendant has a right to counsel. 227

Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, supra note __, at 317-18 (“Misdemeanor attorneys
across the country handle caseloads that make almost any investigation difficult.”); Bibas,
Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2479-80.
223
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
224
There also is “compelling evidence that indigent defendants, petty offenders in
particular, often do not get counsel even when they are legally entitled to it.” Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, supra note __, at 1340-43 (collecting and summarizing various studies)
225
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979). In Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), the
Supreme Court clarified that a suspended prison sentence also may not be imposed on a
misdemeanor defendant unless he was represented by counsel. See id. at 662. An indigent
defendant charged with a felony, however, has an absolute right to government-provided
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This is true regardless of whether
any prison time is actually imposed on the defendant. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738, 743 n.9 (1994).
226
See 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 11.2(a) at n.30 (3d ed. 2014); Shelton, 535
U.S. at 669 n.8.
227
As a matter of federal constitutional law, courts have uniformly concluded that an
offense’s potential collateral consequences have no bearing on whether an indigent
defendant is entitled to counsel. See, e.g., Clapman, supra note __, at 603. As a matter of
state law, a handful of jurisdictions have indicated that an offense’s collateral consequences
may be relevant to defining the scope of the right. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., CRIM.
PROCEDURE § 11.2(a) at n.34 (3d ed. 2014). But those jurisdictions are few in number and,
generally speaking, appear to consider an offense’s collateral consequences as merely one
factor among many when deciding whether the right to state-provided counsel applies in a
given case.
222
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C.

Misdemeanor Prosecutors

Strategic undercharging can also affect which line prosecutor is
responsible for handling the case. 228
This is important because
misdemeanor prosecutors can differ in meaningful ways from felony
prosecutors. Misdemeanor prosecutors are frequently the most junior and
least experienced attorneys in the office. 229 Given their lack of seniority,
misdemeanor prosecutors often need supervisory approval for any number
of case-altering decisions. 230 Unsurprisingly, junior prosecutors tend to be
the “most deferential to supervisory authority and are therefore least likely
to buck [office] policy.” 231 As a result, misdemeanor prosecutors may be less
likely to second-guess the initial charging decisions that were made by
more senior prosecutors in the office. 232
Misdemeanor prosecutors also tend to carry caseloads that far
outpace their felony colleagues. 233 For example, one leading study reports
that misdemeanor prosecutors in many of the country’s most populous
districts are responsible for hundreds of cases at any given time. 234 “In
Tarrant County, Texas, home of Fort Worth,” for example, “misdemeanor
prosecutors juggle between 1200 and 1500 matters apiece.” 235
Given such caseloads, a prosecutor’s capacity to scrutinize the merits
of a particular case will typically be quite limited. As one prosecutor I
interviewed put it: “The amount of attention you can give to a misdemeanor
is a fraction of the attention you can give a felony. There is rarely an
opportunity to reevaluate the case after the initial charging decision and
determine whether different charges are more appropriate.” 236 This is
particularly significant since cases charged as misdemeanors are not

This is particularly true in large prosecutor’s offices that have dedicated misdemeanor
units. See supra note __.
229
See, e.g., Lee, supra note __, at 596.
230
Cade, supra note __, at 1783 (“New prosecutors, cutting their teeth on misdemeanor
cases, may need permission from supervisors to deviate significantly from the original
charge.”); Bowers, Punishing, supra note __, at 1128 (“line prosecutors often must obtain
supervisory approval before dismissing cases”).
231
Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note __, at 1703-04.
232
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
233
See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 N.W. U. L. REV. 261 (2011).
234
See id. at 267-73 & tbl. 1 (giving examples from most of the country’s largest cities,
including Los Angeles, Chicago, Manhattan, Brooklyn, Miami, Philadelphia, and Dallas);
see also Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice, supra note __, at 664 n.150 (observing that,
in New York City, Assistant District Attorneys often carry upwards of 200 open
misdemeanor cases at any given time).
235
Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note __, at 272. For a synopsis of potential harms caused
by excessive prosecutorial caseloads generally, see id. at 279-96.
236
Telephone Interview with Individual K, Current Prosecutor (July 8, 2015).
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subjected to an independent, initial screening mechanism, such as a grand
jury or a preliminary hearing. 237
Finally, new prosecutors tend to be “systematically harsher” than
their more senior colleagues. 238 Among other things, this means they are
less likely to bargain away potential penalties on equitable grounds alone. 239
“Inexperienced prosecutors” are also more likely to “press for overly broad
categories in their sentencing recommendations, when more individualized
judgments could produce more proportional and economical
sentencing.” 240
IV.

TAKING SERIOUS MISDEMEANORS SERIOUSLY

In many respects, misdemeanors and felonies are processed in two
different worlds: different judges, different attorneys, different docket
pressures, and different procedures. This Part focuses on that last
difference—the procedural disparity between misdemeanors and felonies. 241
For reasons explained earlier, that disparity is an integral component of
strategic undercharging.
The procedural gap between misdemeanors and felonies has long
rested on two grounds: (1) heightened procedures are warranted only for
offenses of a sufficient severity; 242 and (2) the sole metric for determining an
offense’s relative severity is the potential term of imprisonment it

See supra notes __; Telephone Interview with Individual K, Current Prosecutor (July 8,
2015) (explaining that “misdemeanors are unloved from the beginning”).
238
Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2475; see also Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial
Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 190 (2007) (in the words
of one former prosecutor: “As a baby DA, I thought all criminals needed to be punished to
the fullest extent of the law . . . .”).
239
As Ronald Wright and Kay Levine document in their recent study about the effect
experience has on prosecutors over time, “[e]ntry-level and junior prosecutors [are] more
likely than their experienced colleagues to say that it is important to stick with the most
serious charges during plea negotiations.” Wright & Levine, supra note __, at 1087-88.
240
Id. at 1069.
241
Even when the procedural safeguards afforded misdemeanor defendants are similar to
those provided felony defendants, the misdemeanor version usually comes in watereddown form. For example, while most misdemeanor defendants have a right to
government-provided counsel, the amount of funding provided to that counsel will pale in
comparison to what an attorney would receive if the case were a felony. See supra notes __.
Similarly, a misdemeanor defendant afforded the right to demand a jury trial will typically
only be entitled to a jury of a smaller size than a felony defendant (e.g., 6 jurors instead of
12). See supra notes __.
242
As Alexandra Natapoff summarized this state of affairs, “[i]f the United States Supreme
Court can be said to have a misdemeanor theory, it is that lesser punishments should
trigger reduced procedural entitlements.” Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note __, at 1350.
237
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authorizes. 243 This Part challenges the continued wisdom of the second
ground, and claims that collateral consequences also should be considered
when determining an offense’s relative severity. Under that approach,
misdemeanor offenses carrying certain collateral consequences would
trigger the same bundle of entitlements typically afforded felony
defendants. This would better honor an important principle underlying the
criminal justice system: serious sanctions require serious procedures.
A.

Reconsidering Relative Severity

While potential imprisonment remains a useful proxy for offense
severity, the misdemeanor-felony line should no longer serve as the sole
litmus test. 244 Instead, an offense’s potential collateral consequences
should also be factored into the calculus.
The current prison-centric benchmarks for determining relative
severity were designed at a time when the overwhelming majority of
collateral consequences—and especially those generally considered most
severe—were limited to felony convictions. As explained earlier, that is no
longer the case. 245 Now that many important collateral consequences are
triggered by misdemeanors, defining severity solely in terms of potential
prison time fails to capture the full picture of an offense’s potential
sanctions—and, therefore, fails to capture the full picture of an offense’s
relative severity. 246
This is true regardless of whether one views severity from the
perspective of the legislature that enacted the offense or the defendant
charged with the offense. Consider the following (and fairly common)
example. A jurisdiction creates an offense for misdemeanor sexual abuse
and caps potential imprisonment at twelve months or less. In addition, the
legislature requires a lengthy period of sex offender registration upon
conviction. 247 It would be mistaken to conclude that the legislature did not
view misdemeanor sexual abuse as a serious offense simply because it
See supra notes __. The lone exception is the constitutional right to counsel, which uses
both a potential imprisonment and actual imprisonment metric for purposes of
determining relative severity. See supra notes __.
244
For a thoughtful and thought-provoking take on the difficulties of drawing lines when it
comes to the issue of relative crime severity, see Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and
Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004).
245
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
246
When collateral consequences were effectively limited to felony offenses, little was lost
when severity was understood exclusively as a function of potential prison time. This is
because a conclusion about an offense’s severity would have been the same regardless of
whether collateral consequences were considered (since those consequences were confined
to offenses already considered serious).
247
See supra notes __ and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, like New York, a
defendant convicted of certain misdemeanor sex offenses face only a maximum of three
months in jail but will be required to register as a sex offender for a minimum of 15 years.
See supra note __.
243
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declined to authorize a higher potential term of imprisonment. 248 Rather,
the legislature employed an alternative and additional penalty in the form
of sex offender registration. 249
The same can be said when viewing matters from the perspective of
the defendant. It is far from clear, for example, whether a typical defendant
would consider a modest amount of additional prison time to be a more or
less severe penalty than being required to register as a sex offender for over
a decade. Indeed, there is evidence that at least some defendants are
willing to risk additional time in prison in the hopes of avoiding a severe
collateral consequence that is now triggered by a misdemeanor
conviction. 250
Accounting for an offense’s potential collateral consequences would
reflect the increasingly central role such consequences currently play in our
criminal justice system. The collateral consequences imposed on a
defendant are often the most significant penalties that result from a
criminal conviction. 251 The procedures aimed at ensuring accurate and fair
criminal adjudications should, simply put, reflect this new normal.
One potential objection to considering collateral consequences when
determining relative severity is that it would create difficult line-drawing
problems about which consequences should be taken into account—and
which ones should qualify as sufficiently severe. If nothing else, the
misdemeanor-felony line provides a clear point of demarcation. Injecting
collateral consequences into the mix would—even if only temporarily—
See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 762-63 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (“Although
the seriousness of the prescribed [penal] sanctions is a valuable objective indication of the
general normative judgment of the seriousness of the offense, other evidence”—such as an
offense’s collateral consequences—“is available and should not be ignored.”); Schroeder,
supra note __, at 516 (“any collateral consequence to an offender that might result from a
conviction for a particular offense is arguably relevant in assessing the seriousness of the
offense”).
249
At first blush, a legislature’s decision to impose simultaneously a lengthy period of sex
offender registration for a conviction yet cap potential imprisonment at twelve, six, or even
three months might make little sense. If the offense warrants a lengthy period of sex
offender registration, why would it not also warrant at least the possibility of substantial
jail time? The most likely answer is that legislatures wanted to expand a prosecutor’s menu
of charging options, thereby making it easier for prosecutors to successfully impose sex
offender registration requirements on more offenders. The menu analogy is, of course,
from Professor Stuntz. See Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note __, at 2549.
250
See, e.g., Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 2002) (defendant seeking to withdraw
guilty plea to misdemeanor sex offense on the grounds that counsel failed to inform him of
sex offender registration requirement). See also, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 163 44 A.3d 425 (N.H.
2012) (defendant seeking to withdraw guilty plea to misdemeanor shoplifting on the
grounds that court failed to inform her of deportation consequences); Sames v. State, 805
N.W.2d 565 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (defendant seeking to withdraw guilty plea to
misdemeanor domestic assault on the grounds that counsel failed to inform him of firearm
prohibition).
251
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
248
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muddy that clean dividing line. 252 Among other things, courts and
legislatures tasked with determining relative severity would have to resolve
at least three questions when setting the parameters for the universe of
relevant collateral consequences. 253
The first is whether to consider collateral consequences beyond
those imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction. If a conviction in state court
also would trigger federal collateral consequences, should those federal
consequences be factored in the severity analysis? The answer to this
question likely depends on how one resolves a more fundamental issue
about relative offense severity: should relative severity be viewed from the
perspective of the defendant or from the perspective of the prosecuting
jurisdiction (that is, its legislature).
If the former, then collateral
consequences imposed by other sovereigns should be relevant to the
severity analysis. If the latter, then the possibility of another jurisdiction’s
collateral consequences being imposed on the defendant is largely
irrelevant, since it fails to reflect the views of the prosecuting jurisdiction. 254
The second question is whether to consider collateral consequences
that are not uniformly applied across all defendants. Some collateral
consequences, including firearm prohibitions and sex offender registration,
apply to all defendants convicted of a triggering offense. But some do not.
Consider a federal misdemeanor drug offense where a conviction would
render a non-citizen deportable. The sanction of deportation applies only
to non-citizen defendants. Should the possibility of deportation be
considered relevant for purposes of relative offense severity, even though
that consequence would threaten only some defendants charged with the
pertinent offense? As with the previous question, the answer to this one
likely depends on whether relative severity should be viewed from the
perspective of the defendant or that of the prosecuting jurisdiction.
The third question is whether to consider collateral consequences
that afford the pertinent decision-maker some degree of discretion about
imposing them, or limit consideration to those consequences imposed
automatically upon conviction. 255 Under the current approach, relative
This concern echoes one aspect of the familiar debate involving rules versus standards.
See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992).
253
I assume for present purposes that courts and legislatures would consider only those
consequences imposed by law—that is, those consequences that arise by some form of
state action, not private conduct. See supra note __ (discussing distinction between
consequences imposed by law and those by private action).
254
This has been the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the context of a
constitutional right to a jury trial: only those “additional statutory penalties” adopted by
the legislature that enacted the offense are relevant. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-44, 545
n.11.
255
See supra note __ (discussing distinction between collateral sanctions and discretionary
disqualifications). For an interesting discussion about the American Law Institute’s recent
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severity is determined by looking at potential imprisonment, not the actual
amount of incarceration imposed. Courts and legislatures would therefore
need to decide whether discretionary consequences are similar to potential
incarceration, such that they merit consideration even though the penalty
may not ultimately materialize.
The existence of such open questions should not obscure the fact
that a number of important collateral consequences would be relevant even
under the most restrictive approach: consequences that are automatically
imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction on all defendants convicted of the
pertinent offense. That standard alone would encompass, among other
things, sex offender registration and many firearm prohibitions.
After determining the universe of relevant collateral consequences,
courts and legislatures would also need to decide what consequences
qualify as sufficiently severe to trigger the relevant felony procedure. This
could be done either by identifying the specific consequences that merit
heightened procedures, or on a case-by-case basis using a standard akin to
the one employed by the Supreme Court in the jury trial context—that is,
whether the additional “penalties, viewed in conjunction with the
maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe” to warrant
classifying the offense as a “serious one.” 256
It is important to emphasize here that some procedural safeguards
are required by the Constitution and others are governed exclusively by
statute or court rule. How and where to draw the line may vary depending
on the right at issue, including whether the inquiry is geared towards
establishing a constitutional floor or instead about achieving optimal
criminal justice policy.
I will not attempt here to catalogue which collateral consequences
should trigger which procedural entitlements. For now, my sole aim is to
establish that relative severity—and, by extension, the procedural
protections afforded a criminal defendant—should no longer turn
exclusively on the maximum term of incarceration authorized by the
pertinent offense. The next section explains why there is potentially much
to be gained by including collateral consequences in the relative severity
calculus.

proposal to “fully integrate” collateral consequences into a trial court’s sentencing process,
including by permitting trial judges to “grant relief from specific mandatory collateral
consequences at and after sentencing,” see Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral
Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal
Code, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 247, 260 (2015).
256
Blanton, 489 U.S. 543-45. See also N.J.S.A. §2B:24-1 (New Jersey statute authorizing
counsel for indigent defendants “subjected to a conviction entailing imprisonment in fact
or other consequence of magnitude”) (quoting Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281 (1971))
(emphasis added).
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B.

Implications

Applying felony-level procedures to misdemeanors carrying severe
collateral consequences could have several salutary effects on the
administration of low-level offenses. 257 To begin, it would likely increase
the intensity of initial case screening by prosecutors and, in particular,
encourage additional consideration about whether to charge an offense that
carries a severe collateral consequence—or instead pursue a different
charge that does not (or even no charges at all). 258 Extra attention given at
the screening stage would be a most welcome development in the low-level
offense arena, which is more often known for its quick and deferential-toarrest screening decisions. 259
The implementation of felony-level procedures would also lead to
improved scrutiny and testing of the government’s case after charges have
been initiated. For example, cases would be subject to review by a grand
jury or a judge at a preliminary hearing. This could at least weed out some
of the weakest evidentiary cases, including discouraging prosecutors from
pursuing such cases in the first place. Furthermore, imposing heightened
discovery obligations on the government—in addition to the “free”
discovery provided by preliminary hearings—would give the defense team a
far better picture of the prosecutor’s case than it typically receives in the
normal misdemeanor setting. Among other things, this could help defense
counsel better learn where the government’s pressure points are—or grease
the wheels for a guilty plea upon better appreciating the strength of the
government’s case. Either way, more and earlier available information
would strengthen the ability of the defense team to subject a case to
meaningful adversarial testing.
The adoption of felony-level procedures for serious misdemeanors
would also increase the degree to which prosecutorial charging decisions
account for the views of the local community. “[T]he idea that prosecutors
should be broadly responsive to the concerns of their community” is one
that “runs deep” in American criminal law. 260 Indeed, this commitment to
Because my focus here is on the relationship between the current regime of collateral
consequences and adjudicatory procedures, I do not discuss other potential reforms that
also merit serious consideration. For example, I am putting to the side arguments that
legislatures should cease attaching significant collateral consequences to misdemeanors or
at least should make them comparatively less severe (e.g., misdemeanants are ineligible to
possess a firearm for 5 or 10 years rather than for life). Similarly, reforms to how
misdemeanor cases triggering severe collateral consequences are assigned in prosecutors’
offices or to defense attorneys also deserve more attention that I can give them here.
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community oversight is reflected by the fact that 95 percent of all chief
prosecutors in the United States are elected. 261 But “direct elections are not
likely to prove an effective means of giving prosecutors guidance as to a
community’s enforcement priorities or of holding them accountable for the
discretionary decisions they have already made.” 262
To the extent
prosecutorial elections are contested (which itself is infrequent), 263 they are
typically focused on a few high-profile issues—not the “low-visibility
enforcement decisions” of the sort at issue here. 264
More effective entry points for community influence on
prosecutorial charging decisions are instead the petit jury and, where
available, the grand jury. As Daniel Richman explains, a prosecutor
concerned about conviction rates “must make all her decisions in the
shadow of projected jury responses”—that is, at least, when the defendant
has a right to demand a jury trial. 265 In such circumstances, even “the mere
possibility of a jury trial can bring an often overlooked degree of
accountability into our system of essentially administrative justice.” 266
While this dynamic is “not necessarily the strongest of voices,” the potential
reaction of a group of laypersons drawn from the community surely “has a
far greater say in how prosecutors deploy their resources than [does] any
more direct mechanism of political accountability.” 267
The adoption of felony-level procedures for serious misdemeanors
could have a related beneficial impact—even if a relatively small one—
regarding the community’s perception of the criminal justice system.
“Community participation in the administration of the criminal law,” the
Supreme Court has observed, is “not only consistent with our democratic
heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the
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criminal justice system.” 268 While felony defendants receive a jurisdiction’s
highest forms of due process, misdemeanants typically receive something
that charitably could be called due process “light.” 269
Treating
misdemeanor cases that carry grave penalties more like felonies and less
like traffic infractions could make the process seem more legitimate and
fair, thereby having positive effects on public confidence in the criminal
justice system.
Finally, applying felony procedures to serious misdemeanors may
result in some prosecutors’ and public defender’s offices routing those cases
to more senior attorneys. Since these serious misdemeanors would be
treated as felonies from a procedural perspective, it is possible that
prosecutor and defender offices would respond by shifting responsibility for
such cases to the attorneys that typically handle felony cases. This, in turn,
could have several benefits. As noted, felony attorneys typically handle
lighter caseloads. In addition, those attorneys tend to be more experienced.
The combination of smaller caseloads and more senior attorneys would
increase the odds of achieving individualized (and proportionate) penalties
in a particular case.
I do not mean to suggest that the extension of felony procedures to
misdemeanors triggering severe collateral consequences would be all roses.
Because the efficiency gains associated with charging a misdemeanor would
largely be eliminated, more borderline cases would likely be charged as
felonies in my proposed world. Defendants would thus be exposed to
further and harsher penalties, including the threat of increased
incarceration and a slate of collateral consequences that may not have been
associated with the misdemeanor offense (such as disenfranchisement).
The imposition of such additional penalties could have negative effects on
the defendant, his family, and society at large.
Relatedly, because increased procedures mean increased costs,
prosecutors might decide to forego some cases altogether. It is unlikely
that prosecutors could transfer wholesale all cases that previously would
have been charged as misdemeanors to the felony-side of the ledger.
Indeed, one of the main reasons prosecutors currently engage in strategic
undercharging is because they are stretched too thin as it is.
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Perhaps prosecutors would seek to mitigate the increased costs by
lowering plea prices, in the hopes of inducing earlier and less costly guilty
pleas. For example, prosecutors might view the misdemeanor-felony line as
more permeable than they currently appear to do and offer misdemeanor
pleas for cases initially charged as felonies. Such an offer, however, might
be of limited effect if the collateral consequence is so severe that reduced
prison exposure is of secondary importance to the defendant (such as a
defendant facing deportation or a lengthy period of sex offender
registration).
In short, application of felony procedures to serious
misdemeanors might result in prosecutors declining otherwise meritorious
cases in light of the increased costs they would be forced to bear.
CONCLUSION
This Article explored the impact collateral consequences have on
prosecutors and, in particular, their initial charging decisions. It explained
why the attachment of severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor
offenses is likely to have a gravitational pull on prosecutors, incentivizing
them to charge more borderline cases as misdemeanors rather than
felonies. This is because a misdemeanor triggering a severe collateral
consequence offers prosecutors the ability to impose significant penalties at
a fraction of the cost. Examining the effect collateral consequences have on
prosecutorial decision-making also revealed an important and previously
overlooked charging tactic—strategic undercharging. Finally, this Article
explained why courts and legislatures should look beyond potential
imprisonment when determining relative offense severity, and therefore the
procedures afforded criminal defendants.
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